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Abstract
Several generations of video game consoles have competed in the market since 1972.
Overall, the entire market shares many similar characteristics, such as network effects
and switching cost, which are found in other network-based markets. However, on closer
examination, the video game console industry experienced several generations of
technological change with each generation bringing a different competitive environment
and different set of competitors from the previous one. Consistent with the
Schumpeterian market model, both new and later entrants have competed successfully
with their strong portfolios of technological innovations. Yet, some firms with dominant
market position and strong complementary assets were not able to extend their advantage
to the next generation. The dynamic cause and effect relationships associated with the
multi-generation video game console industry makes an intriguing subject for economic
research. This thesis provides a conceptual framework for analyzing the elements and
dynamics of the competitive video game console market. Using qualitative findings and
empirical data found in recent research literature on market competition and innovation, a
historical analysis of the video game console market was performed. In addition, a
system dynamics model was created to validate and support the analysis of the industry.
The results from the simulation of the model under various competitive scenarios not
only confirm some of the findings from established studies done in this area but also
provide us with new qualitative insights into the dynamics operating in the market.
Thesis advisor: James M. Utterback
Title: David J. McGrath jr (1959) Professor of Management and Innovation
MIT Sloan School of Management
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1 Introduction
Since the Magnavox Odyssey was officially released to the market in 1972 as the first
commercial video game console, the video game console industry has grown to a market
of $18.1 billion in sales (Crandall and Sidak, 2006). 1 Today, as Sony, Nintendo, and
Microsoft enter a new round of battle for market dominance with their next-generation
consoles, many people wonder which company will emerge as the market leader after the
latest round of console wars? Intense rivalry among companies competing in the U.S.
video game console market has always been a common phenomenon. Despite its relative
youth, the 35-year old video game console industry already underwent six eras of
technological shifts. In the face of technological shift, each generation brought new sets
of competitors, innovations, and market dynamics different from the previous one.
Consistent with the Schumpeterian market model, new or later entrants not only
competed successfully in the market, but in some cases, emerged as market leaders
through the possession of strong complementary products and assets. Yet, there were also
firms with dominant market position and strong complementary assets that were not able
to extend their advantage to the next generation. The video game console industry, with a
high turnover in market leaders and rapid technological changes, offers a rich case for
developing theories on innovation diffusion, economics, competition, and strategic
management. The objective of this thesis is to capture and analyze the dynamic cause and
effect relationships of a network-based market exhibiting multiple generations of product.
1 The estimated sale figures for the video game console market segment include sales of hardware and
software.
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1.1 Motivation
Examining the factors that contribute to the success and failure of firms competing in a
competitive environment, this thesis seeks to enrich the discussion about the evolution of
the video game console industry. Many factors fundamental to innovations and
competition are discussed, but the focus is primarily on addressing the following
questions:
1. How will technological discontinuities bring forth new dynamics that change the
competitive rules on which companies operate?
2. How does timing of market entry affect the competitiveness of a firm?
3. What role do complementary assets play in the market?
The primary interest of this thesis is not to refute traditional theoretical frameworks but to
provide clarity and enable decision-makers to align traditional strategies and policies with
market conditions and factors critical to competing successfully in this market. The posed
questions above are addressed by applying:
* Inductive-driven mode of reasoning through historical observations and analysis
of the industry.
* Holistic-driven mode of reasoning through system dynamics modeling and
simulation of the industry.
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First, an inductive-driven analysis of the video game console industry is performed by
drawing from the history and available empirical data of the industry. The historical
analysis answers the three questions using established theoretical frameworks on
competition, innovation diffusion, and strategic management. Next, a holistic-driven
analysis is performed by applying system dynamics to capture both the factors and
processes operating in the market system. The central principle of system dynamics states
that system structure drives system behavior. Thus, the understanding of the processes
operating within the market system is crucial to understanding the larger competitive
environment and the evolution of the video game console market. The process of creating
a system dynamics model enables the researcher to examine how complex system
behaviors emerge from a multiplicity of simple linkages within a system. Together, both
analysis methodologies complement each other and provide insights to the dynamics of
this industry.
1.2 An Overview of Theoretical Frameworks
Let us begin the discussion of the dynamics of the video game console market with the
presentation of pertinent definitions and background.
12
1.2.1 Key Definitions
A list of commonly used terms and their definitions are provided as follows:
" Generation - a period of technology when new innovations emerge to enable a
new wave of products that provide new values or meet the needs of customers.
" Market pioneer - the first firm to sell a product in a new generation of a market.
" Market leader - the firm that achieves the highest market share among its
competitors at the end of a generation of a market.
Some of the definitions were borrowed and modified from Golder and Tellis's (1993)
paper on first-mover advantage. Notably, the use of the term "pioneer" in this thesis
refers to "market pioneer" instead of "product pioneer," which is consistent with the term
"pioneer" or "first mover" in other studies. Also, the word "era" is sometimes used
synonymously with "generation."
1.2.2 Innovations and Dominant Design
The early stages of any industrial evolution are identified with periods of instability,
marked with numerous experiments of the underlying technology in defining a product
design. The design architecture of a product, on which subsequent products in the
industry are based, is called a dominant design (Abernathy and Utterback, 1975). As a
dominant design emerges, the industry tips and the design of products in the industry
13
stabilizes around it. Stable design standards enable the market to enter periods of
equilibrium (Gallagher and Park, 2002) for which the adoption of the technology can take
place at a more accelerated pace (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). As industry shifts
away from experimentation and product innovation, the focus in the industry becomes the
incremental improvements made to the dominant design and manufacturing process
(Tushman and Anderson 1986). During this time the market changes dramatically.
Companies not only have to compete on innovative designs but also on efficient
manufacturing processes and the possession of critical resources. As a result, not many
firms survive this tumultuous transition.
Dominant design does not have to emerge in the beginning of an industrial evolution. A
technological shift between two generations can be so substantial that the previous
dominant design is rendered obsolete and new standards emerged as a result. Change in
dominant design that occurs when the industry has reached a certain level of maturity has
implications. Henderson and Clark (1995) observe that architectural innovation, defined
as innovation that changes the way the components of a product are linked together,
brings new rules to the industry that may act to tip the technological standard in the
market. This shift in technological innovation between generations is substantial enough
that incumbents are likely to struggle as they adopt the new innovation with their high
degree of incumbent inertia. Thus the authors suggest that architectural innovation
potentially destroys the usefulness of existing knowledge of a firm. On the other hand,
such technological innovation may give other competitors the ability to gain market share
14
at the expense of the incumbent, which explains why a new entrant like Sony ended as
the leader with the introduction of the Playstation.
1.2.2.1 De Facto Standard
While establishing a dominant design is a critical objective for firms competing in the
market, this precept does not necessarily confer advantage to the firm that creates that
design. A successful design needs to be set by the market either as a formal or de facto
standard (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Gallagher and Park, 2002). Often it is the
consumers who decide what standard to eventually adopt. For instance, Sony successfully
established the dominant design of videocassette recording (VCR) through U-matic, an
earlier format from which video home system (VHS) and Betamax were based. However,
the choice of consumers during the commercialization of VCR some years later
established Matsushita VHS as the de facto standard (Cusumano, Mylonadis, and
Rosenbloom, 1992). Once dominant design and market standards are determined, market
dynamics shift from a battle between firms with competing standards to a battle among
firms competing with products sharing the same standards (Gallagher and Park, 2002).
For example, once VHS became the market de facto standard in the U.S., Sony halted
production of Betamax recorders and began manufacturing VHS recorders for the
country.
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1.2.2.2 Complementary Assets
Technology is not the only determinant in conferring advantage to firms. Afuah and
Grimaldi (2005) put forth the notion that "an architectural innovation usually triggers not
only the need for new interactions and linkages ... it also triggers the need for new
complementary assets." In terms of a new product generation market, the extent of
product change and the usefulness of entrant's existing resource base determine the
success of market debut (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1998). Mere innovation alone
cannot guarantee market success. In fact, it is quite common to find competitors to have
profited more from an innovation than the firm that first commercialized it. In the
seminal work by Teece (1986), the author explains that "when imitation is easy, markets
don't work well, and the profits from innovation may accrue to the owners of certain
complementary assets, rather than to the developers of the intellectual property." If
complementary assets play such an important role, what are complementary assets?
According to Teece (1986), complementary assets are "the capabilities and assets that are
required to support a particular innovation, other than those fundamentally associated
with the innovation." In other words, complementary assets play a pivotal role in shaping
a firm's ability to profit from innovations.
1.2.2.3 Relevance to Thesis
Using the established principles of innovation diffusion and dominant design, this thesis
discusses innovation occurring in the video game console industry. In an industry where
16
new standards can potentially emerge in every generation, we are interested in exploring
the dynamics spanning multiple generations of innovations in this industry. An area
worth looking into is the apparent change of market leadership that occurs whenever a
technological change is significant.
1.2.3 First-Mover Advantage
There are huge incentives for market pioneers to capture first-mover advantage. Benefits
of first-mover advantage include the control of key resources and the creation of barriers
to entry for followers (Robinson and Fornell, 1985). In short, first-mover advantage
seems to offer firms a good lead in the competitive race of gaining market share. Yet,
despite all its rewards, pioneers face mounting risks and cost by being the first in the
market. A later entrant with lower operational cost, superior technology, and the
opportunity to learn from the pioneer often enables the competitor to achieve eventual
market leadership (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988). In a high-technology industry
where discontinuity of technology is a common occurrence, the pioneers who cannot
learn from the successes and failures of other firms, are rarely rewarded from
innovations. A rush to release products to the market may not be a good strategy for
creating and sustaining competitiveness in a firm without a close examination of the
firm's resource base and market conditions. The remaining section highlights theories for
and against first-mover advantage. For example, even though EMI was the first to
develop the computed axial tomography (CAT) scanner, it was firms with experience in
17
medical instrumentation like GE and Technicare that eventually stripped EMI of its
market share (Teece, 1986).
1.2.3.1 Theories for First-Mover Advantage
Theories arguing for first-mover advantage us the following four principal factors
proposed by various scholars in the field (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Farrell and
Klemperer, 2006):
" Preemption of assets.
" Technological leadership.
" Buyer switching costs.
* Network effects.
1.2.3.1.1 Preemption of Assets
The shepherd's job is to lead a herd of sheep to green pastures upon which the herd can
graze. Likewise, by being the first in the market, the pioneering firm preempts scarce
assets, such as suppliers and distribution channels conducive for the development and
production of products by the company. Moreover, early acquisitions are likely to result
in economies of scale early, which may ultimately lower production cost for the first-
mover.
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Technological Leadership
Similar to the shepherd who acquires green pastures for grazing sheep, an early lead in
developing innovative products can bestow technical leadership to the first mover. First-
mover advantage in technology means the firm may acquire an early lead in acquiring
knowledge in designing more innovative products than its competitors. By establishing
some form of pre-emptive technology lock-in, the firm is now in a better position to
establish a dominant design successfully in the market. An early lead will often bestow
sufficient time for the firm to learn from experience, thereby allowing it to develop more
efficient, innovative production processes, which over time translates to reduced
operational cost.
1.2.3.1.3 Switching Costs
First-movers are driven by the prospects of attaining customer lock-in and high consumer
switching cost. Their motivation is if a consumer makes a substantial investment in a
product by the time competing products enter the market, the consumer has less incentive
to switch due to higher cost and stronger brand loyalty.
1.2.3.1.4 Network Effect
Network effect is defined as the phenomenon which causes the value of a product to be
proportional to the number of other customers who use the product. In other words, the
19
1.2.3.1.2
larger the network of users of a product, the greater the value derived from that network.
In markets that exhibit strong network effect, a first mover stands to gain and benefit
from the exponential growth in sales as more people purchase the product.
1.2.3.2 Theories against First-Mover Advantage
Critics of first-mover advantage abound. Various scholars have suggested why first-
movers may be at a disadvantage with the following factors
" Free-rider effects.
* Firm's adaptability.
* Incumbent inertia.
* Commitment of resources.
1.2.3.2.1 Free-rider Effects
Certain market conditions present opportunities for competing firms to acquire early
movers' resources, including technology, production process, and distribution channels.
In many cases, the cost of innovating often exceeds the cost of imitating. Free-riding
occurs when the acquisition of resources may become less than a fair share of the costs of
the production. This is why followers may profit more from an innovation than the
innovator; the investments by imitators are usually lower than those by innovators
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988).
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1.2.3.2.2 Firm's Adaptability
Technology or market condition changes allow competing firms a stand the chance to
implement less costly production processes or to produce products implemented by better
technology. In addition, market dynamics and changes in consumer preferences may
present opportunities with similar effects as those of technological shifts. These changes
require the pioneer to maintain the ability to detect market changes and adapt quickly
when circumstances arise. Notably, a risk remains if the pioneer is incapable of meeting
market changes or competitive threats that late entrants pose.
1.2.3.2.3 Incumbent Inertia
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) suggest the "vulnerability of first-mover is often
enhanced by incumbent inertia." Companies suffering from incumbent inertia are so
assured of their market power that they often fail to detect or address threats from new
competitors. Incumbent inertia is frequently motivated by profit maximizing rationale,
which often leads to the wrong response in maintaining the market leadership initially
captured by the pioneering firm.
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1.2.3.2.4 Commitment of Resources
Pioneers may not be willing to commit the necessary resources needed to succeed once
they are in the market. Justifications for such inaction include funding deprivation, high
capital cost, short-sightedness, or complacency. In the long run, the lack of commitment
may starve the company of the resources it needs to grow in the new market and as a
result, the company can quickly lose its competitiveness.
1.2.3.3 Relevance to Thesis
The order of market entry is widely written on subject in management and economic
research literature. However, from these studies there is not a clear conclusion to support
or refute strategic advantage associated with market pioneers. From our market data, we
found that several first-movers even those with a substantial early market launch were not
able to capitalize on first-mover advantage successfully. For example, 3DO Interactive
Multiplayer launched a year ahead of its competitors and was quickly displaced by
competing products introduced later. This thesis strives to understand the linkages
between complementary assets and entry the company's entry timing in order to gain
further insights to first-mover advantage.
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1.2.4 Network Effects
Economists Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985) first defined network effect as "the
utility derived from consumption of these goods or services increases as additional
consumers purchase the same goods and services." According to Katz and Shapiro
(1985), and later Economides (1996), network effects can be broadly classified as either
direct or indirect. Direct network effects are generated in situations with direct effects of
the agents within a network consuming the same good. Examples of direct network
effects are the Internet and telephone. Indirect network effects arise from the
consumption of a base good and its complementary goods so that the value of the base
goods increase as the consumption of complementary goods increases. A complementary
good is defined as a good that is consumed with another good. All hardware/software
systems, such as CD, VCR, and video game console, belong to this category of network
effects.
Network effects from many real world industrial systems lead to a self-reinforcing state
that causes exponential growth in the system (Gandal, Kende, and Rob, 2000;
Economides and Himmelberg, 1995). A good example of this phenomenon is the fax
machine. The ownership of a fax machine by one individual does little to the boost the
sales of fax machines, but a network of even a few thousand users indirectly benefits
other owners of a fax machine and further drives up demand for fax machines
(Economides and Himmelberg, 1995). The overall value of a product often increases
exponentially with increased ownership (Shapiro and Varian, 1998) and a first mover in a
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market exhibiting strong network effects can effectively capture a significant portion of
the market early on. It is commonly known in the business of hardware/software systems
that software sells hardware (Gandal, Kende, and Rob, 2000). This is a marketing
strategy that reflects the effects of complementary goods. Through this consumption, the
demand of one good becomes directly proportional to the demand of the other good. Take
the case of the personal computer (PC) industry, the utility that a consumer gets from
owning a PC is not directly affected by other users owning the PC as much as it is with
other users owning the software.
1.2.4.1 Relevance to the Thesis
The video game console industry, like any other network-based industry exhibits a strong
mutual dependency between hardware and software. Recently, an extensive body of
research and publications provided an in-depth, empirical analysis of the indirect network
effects of the video game console industry (Clements and Ohashi, 2004, Hu and Prieger,
2005; Strube et al, 2007). Other studies rely on qualitative, historical analysis of the
indirect network effects of the industry (Gallagher and Park, 2002; Schilling, 2003). This
thesis incorporates some of the findings found in the referenced literature into a system
dynamics model.
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1.3 Thesis Organization
Chapter One begins with a brief presentation on pertinent concepts. The chapter takes an
in-depth look at complementary goods, network effects, and market entry timing. Chapter
Two provides an overview of the history of game console. Chapter Three is devoted to a
historical analysis of the industry. For empirical evidence, the chapter draws from
marketing data published in the industry. The inductive-driven analysis is then followed
by a holistic-driven analysis described in Chapter Four. A system dynamics model is
developed and simulated using both hypothetical and real empirical data to analyze the
interactions within the market system. The chapter also reports the results from the
simulations of the system dynamics model and compares the results with the empirical
evidence previously presented in Chapter Three. Finally, the thesis closes with
conclusions and implications in Chapter Five.
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2 The Video Game Console Market
The video game console industry, with a relatively short product cycle, is characterized
by multiple generations of products within its 35 year history. Competition has remained
intense and companies have struggled to stay the course of the business. Moreover, each
incumbent market leader faced difficulties maintaining their market position when the
industry shifted from one generation to another. Despite intense competition and high
barriers to entry, we have seen many companies, notably Microsoft and Sony, enter the
game console market and achieved a high degree of success.
2.1 Industry Overview
The video game console industry structure is summarized in Figure 1. On the hardware
side (the right side of the diagram), the console manufacturers (e.g. Nintendo and Sony)
develop, produce, and sell consoles to the consumers. Console manufacturers purchase
components from hardware suppliers (e.g. Intel and nVidia) and may sometime enter
partnership with component suppliers to develop next-generation components such as
multimedia chips. On the software side of the value chain (the left side of the diagram),
game publishers (e.g. Electronic Arts and SquareSoft) distribute games to the consumers.
Console manufacturers get a portion of revenue from the sale of games by game
publisher through licensing agreements made between these two entities. Sometimes,
certain stipulations may be added to the licensing agreement forbiddomg software
26
publishers from producing a game title on different platforms, hence enforcing some
form of game exclusivity for that console (e.g. Grand Theft Auto on the Sony Playstation
2).
Content Proider
license content to
Game Developers HardwareSupplers
develop ames for provide components
eConsoleGame Publishers license contracts to Manfaters
distribute games to distribute consoles to
Retailers
sell games to
Consumers
Figure 1 - The value chain of the game console industry2
Most game publishers also function as game developers by relying on internal software
development teams for game development (e.g. Electronic Arts). Other game publishers
use external game studios (e.g. Bioware and Westwood Studios) for game development.
Today, intellectual content, storylines, and characters from content providers such as
2 Source: Adapted from P. Coughlan. Note on Home Video Game Technology and Industry Structure.
Harvard Business School Case 9-700-107, Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA, 2000; J.
Strube, S. Schade, P. Schmidt, and P. Buxmann. Simulating Indirect Network Effects in the Video Game
Market. Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'07), pp.
160b, 2007.
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National Football League (NFL), Star Wars, and Marvel Comics are becoming
increasingly integral to games as franchised content can help to differentiate a game from
its competition.
2.2 Generations of Game Console
While video games existed before 1972, they were mostly confined to academic and
government labs. The commercialization of video games in the home market segment
began with the introduction of the Magnavox Odyssey. The first and second generations
of consoles ushered in an era of high market growth in the late 70's and early 80's.
However a flood of unauthorized, poor quality games saturated the market and by 1983
led to the demise of the U.S. video game console market. After two years of minimal
activities, the market reemerged with the introduction of the Nintendo Entertainment
System (NES). Through intense market competitiveness and rapid innovations, the
industry developed into the multi-billion dollar industry of today. Figure 2 shows the real
introductory prices adjusted for inflation using 2006 prices while Table I summarizes the
different generations of game consoles according to their introduction date and operating
performance.
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Figure 2 - The real retail price (adjusted for 2006 price) of various game consoles 3
3 Source: Compiled from: Curmudgeon Gamer. Retrieved April 2, 2007 from
http://curmudgeongamer.com/2006/05/history-of-console-prices-or-500-aint.html; Leonard Herman.
Phoenix: The Fall & Rise of Video Games. Rolenta Press, 1997; W. Forster. Encyclopedia of
Game.Machines: Consoles, Handhelds, and Home Computers 1972 - 2005. Gameplan, Germany, 2005.
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i
Generation Nominal Operating Performance
(Time Platform Release Intro CPU Graphics
Period) Date Price Clock Bit # Display Storage
(US$) Speed Rating Colors
1st Magnavox Odyssey 4  May 1972 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A
(1972 - 1979) Atari PONG5  1975 -6 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Fairchild Channel F Aug. 1976 170 1.78 Mhz 8 4 2K
Atari 2600 Oct. 1977 200 1.2 Mhz 8 16 32K
2nd Magnavox Odyssey 2 1978 200 1.79 Mhz 8 16 8K
(1976 - 1984) Mattel Intellivision 1980 300 0.9 Mhz 8 16 16K
Atari 5200 1982 250 1.79 Mhz 8 16 32K
Coleco Colecovision Sep. 1982 200 3.58 Mhz 8 16 8K
Nintendo NES Oct. 1985 200 1.79 Mhz 8 16 512K
(19843rd 1 ) Sega Master System Jun. 1986 200 3.58 Mhz 8 16 512K
Atari 7800 Jun. 1986 140 1.79 Mhz 8 16 128K
NEC TurboGrafx-16' Aug. 1989 200 7.16 Mhz 8 32 2.5M
(19884-1997) Sega Genesis Sep.1991 190 7.6 Mhz 16 64 4M
Nintendo Super NES Sep. 1991 200 3.58 Mhz 16 256 6M
Philips CD-i 1991 400 15Mhz 32 16M 660M
3DO Interactive Multiplayer Oct. 1993 700 12.5Mhz 32 16M 660M
5th Atari Jaguar Oct. 1993 250 3.5Mhz 16 16M 6M
(1993 - 2005) Sega Saturn' May 1995 400 28.6 Mhz 32 16M 660M
Sony Playstation Sep. 1995 300 33.8Mhz 32 16M 660M
Nintendo N64 Oct. 1996 200 93.75Mhz 64 4B 64M
Bandai Pippen 1996 620 66Mhz 64 256 660M
6th Sega Dreamcast Sep. 1999 200 200Mhz 128 4B 1.2G
(1998 - Sony Playstation 2 Oct. 2000 300 295Mhz 128 4B 4.7G
Present) Nintendo GameCube Nov. 2001 200 485Mhz 128 4B 1.5G
Microsoft Xbox Nov. 2001 300 733Mhz 128 4B 4.7G
Table 1 - Summary of game consoles and their technical performance 10
4 The Magnavox Odyssey was powered Analog logic chips.
5 The Atari PONG was powered by custom logic chip 3659-IC, which was technically not a
microprocessor.
6 Price was not available for the Atari PONG.
7 While NEC TurboGrafx-16's CPU was 8-bit, its graphics processor was 16-bit.
8 While Atari Jaguar's CPU was 16-bit, its digital signal processor (DSP) was 32-bit, and the animation
processor (blitter) was 64-bit.
9 Saturn had two CPUs.
10 Source: Adapted from W. Forster. Encyclopedia of Game.Machines: Consoles, Handhelds, and Home
Computers 1972 - 2005. Gameplan, Germany, 2005; S. Gallagher and S. Park. Innovation and Competition
in Standard-Based Industries: A Historical Analysis of the US Home Video Game Market. IEEE
Transactions on Engineering Management, Vol. 49, Issue 1, pp. 67-82, 2002.
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2.3 Early Days
The game console industry had its humble beginning at Brookhaven Laboratories,
Connecticut in 1958 when Willy Higinbotham, a physicist at the research institution,
developed a simple interactive tennis game on an oscilloscope. Unfortunately, the
machine that it ran on was exorbitantly expensive and ultimately limited the diffusion of
the technology beyond the confines of the lab (Kent, 2001). The first true computer game
was Space War where two players shoot missiles at each other's spacecraft. The game
was programmed on a Digital Equipment Corporation PDP-1 by students, Steve Russell
and Alan Kotok, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1961 (Kent, 2001). Even
though the game was well received in the small community of computer scientists and
hackers at that time, it never commercialized as a consumer game.
2.4 The First Generation (1972 - 1979)
Thus far games had been developed and played on expensive computer systems found
only in corporate and academic labs. Video games were out of reach to consumers until
1970 when Ralph Baer, an engineer at the military contractor Sanders, developed a
simple interactive game on consumer TV set, which ultimately paved the way for the
commercialization of video games in the consumer market.
The first home video game console was the Magnavox Odyssey, which was released in
the U.S. in 1972. The production and marketing of the game console began when
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Magnavox, a subsidiary of electronic manufacturer Philips, bough the patents that Baer
filed for his TV game invention. Only about 100,000 units of the Odyssey were sold in
the first year (Forster, 2003). While the Magnavox Odyssey was a novel, innovative
product at the time, it was retailed only through Magnavox dealers, which led to the
perception amongst consumers that the game console only worked on Magnavox TVs
(Winter, 2007). Even with a misleading marketing strategy, demand for the product was
fairly well received. However, weak intellectual property protection and the advent of
cheap Odyssey clones in the market further reduced the demand of the Odyssey. One of
the clone manufacturers, Atari, would soon change the competitive landscape with the
introduction of the most successful video game console in the 70's.
2.5 The Second (8-bit) Generation
In 1971, Bushnell, a young charismatic entrepreneur from Utah founded Atari to develop
and market coin-operated arcade machines. The company's first order of business was to
create a ball and paddle game, much like Higinbotham's and Baer's experimental game
concepts. This new game named PONG was officially launched to the market in 1972. It
was very successful and helped establish Atari as a serious game manufacturer in the
early days of the industry.
As the industry evolved from its primordial stage, the need to make the game consoles
programmable for a variety of exchangeable games became a pressing issue. Even though
Atari was well positioned to debut a radical new product to address this need, it was
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semiconductor pioneer Fairchild Semiconductor that released the first microprocessor-
based game console, named Channel F. The design of the console was a breakthrough
because it offered the ability to play multiple plug-in games. More significantly, the new
console established the dominant design of the home video game console on which all
subsequent products are based. Despite innovative design, the Channel F failed to appeal
early buyers. A year after the introduction of Channel F, Fairchild lost interest and
eventually exited the market.
Even though the home segment of the video game market was small, it grew rapidly due
to the novel concept of allowing people to play electronic games in the comfort of their
own homes. After the initial success of PONG, Atari looked to the home video game
market segment to expand its business. In late 1977, Atari officially entered the market
with the launch of the Atari Video Computer System (VCS), which was later renamed to
Atari 2600. At $200, over 25 million units of the Atari 2600 were sold in its first six years
(Coughlan, 2001; Cohen, 1984). By 1980, Atari emerged as the clear market leader with
a hard to beat brand name. Despite Atari not having the most advanced game console at
the time, the company operated on sound business strategies that contributed to its
success. Atari agreed to being acquired by Warner Communication to access the greater
financial resources needed to grow the business. Furthermore, Atari, more than any other
competitors, realized early the strategic advantage of software in differentiating its
console from the competition. It formed and benefited enormously from strategic
partnerships with arcade developers who converted popular arcade hits, like Pac-Man and
Space Invaders, to the 2600. Through these partnerships, Atari successfully expanded the
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library of quality games on the Atari, further solidifying the Atari 2600 as the dominant
game console of its time.
Two notable challengers to Atari's dominance in the video game console market emerged
in the 70's and early 80's, Mattel and Coleco. Mattel entered the market with the launch
of the Intellivision in 1980. While the audio and visual capabilities of Mattel Intellivision
were ahead of those of the Atari 2600, it was no match to Atari's huge collection of
arcade converted games. By the end of 1983, the Mattel sold fewer than 2 million units of
the Intellivision and barely made a dent in Atari's market dominance (Forster, 2005). The
other challenger, Coleco, introduced the Colecovision in 1982. The Colecovision's
technical performance was convincingly better than the Atari 2600. Moreover, the
console was positively well-received in the market. In the beginning of 1983, the
Colecovision even outsold the 2600 (Schilling, 2003). Unfortunately, Coleco's market
success would be denied later that year when the entire U.S. video game industry
collapsed on itself.
2.6 Game Over: The Crash of 1983
In 1981 the video game industry peaked. At the same time, the market was getting
overcrowded with more than fifty firms competing. Furthermore, competition from
personal computers intensified as they became less expensive and as more game titles
were converted to personal computers. Yet there was no slowing down from game
suppliers as hardware manufacturers continued to produce more consoles and game
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developers more game titles. By the middle of 1983, there was simply an oversupply of
game titles. In fact, in 1983 game manufacturers doubled the number of new game titles
from all previous years combined (Forster 2000). Worse, many of these games were of
poor quality, which did not help to drive demand. Huge inventory backlogs made
companies resort to dumping their inventory at rock-bottom prices. Despite lower prices,
games still suffered from the dearth of creativity." The oversupply of bad games eroded
consumer confidence and retailers to experience losses, eventually leading to the game
industry collapsing on itself at the end of 1983.
The crash of 1983 decimated the market and many companies left it. Many software
developers migrated to the personal computer market where they continued developing
games. Most console manufacturers could not make that market transition as easily as
their software counterparts and remained in the video game console market. The few that
remained, including Atari, struggled to survive. However, game manufacturers (both
hardware and software) were not the only companies that fell victim to the crash of 1983;
distributors were left holding huge unsold inventories after the crash.
2.7 The Third Generation (1984 - 1991)
Despite poor demand and market conditions, Japanese firm Nintendo made a surprising
entry to the U.S. video game console market in 1985 with the introduction of the
Nintendo Entertainment System (NES). While the NES was an 8-bit game console with
" E.T. the Extra Terrestrial was the most notable example. It developed and was completed in five weeks
with poor quality.
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marginal speed performance over its competition, the sound and graphics capabilities of
the machine far exceeded those of its predecessors.
Against the backdrop of a declining market, Nintendo convinced two key determinants in
the market to make the launch of the NES a successful one: the distributors and
consumers. The distributors, badly affected by the market crash two years earlier were
reluctant to stock anything relating to video games (Sheff, 1993). The consumers who
had lost confidence in game console or had moved to personal computers, needed to be
persuaded to return to the video game console market. To overcome these challenges,
Nintendo first adopted a strategy to woo the distributors. They formed attractive
incentives to retailers who agree to stock their merchandise by offering to buy back any
unsold consoles. Seeing this as a no-lose situation, the retailers accepted Nintendo's
proposal. On the consumer front, Nintendo launched an aggressive marketing campaign
to win back consumers to the market. Nintendo's plan worked and over a million units
were sold by the first year (Herman, 1997).
Nintendo learned from Atari's mistake and formulated a strategy to win and maintain
consumer confidence by indirectly controlling the quantity and quality of games through
licensing. Under Nintendo's licensing agreement, third-party developers were subjected
to content regulation, restricted from making games on other platforms, and required to
preorder minimum quantity of cartridges from Nintendo.1 2 While the licensing policies
improved the overall quality of games and restore consumer confidence, its draconian
tone frustrated many developers. But with the NES selling like hotcakes, most game
12 Nintendo manufactured all cartridges for the NES.
36
developers were willing to comply with Nintendo's terms. From a strategic viewpoint,
such maneuvers allowed Nintendo to exert tight control of complementary goods, which
in the presence of network effects enable early business growth. Apart from third-party
developers, Nintendo also relied on its internal software teams to produce first-party
games, such as Super Mario Brothers, for building its library of software. By the end of
1988, Nintendo's new business model not only revived the home video game console
market but also propelled the company to become the undisputed leader of this era.
In the third generation, we also witnessed the U.S. market entry of another Japanese
console manufacturer Sega. The company marked its market debut as a home video game
console with the introduction of its 8-bit console, the Sega Master System in 1987. The
console sold fairly well, but compared to Nintendo, it never gained any significant
presence in the market. By the end of the era, Sega managed to sell two million units of
Sega Master System in the U.S. In contrast, Nintendo sold 20 million units of the NES
(Schilling, 2003).
2.8 The Fourth Generation (1988 - 1997)
In 1989, semiconductor manufacturer NEC brought the TurboGrafx-16, that was selling
very well in Japan, to America. Even though its CPU was technically an 8-bit
microprocessor, its 16-bit multimedia chips were vastly superior to those found in
competing products. Although the product was well received in the Japanese market due
to the existence of good Japanese third party support, poor marketing and the lack of
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software titles designed specifically for American gamers inhibited the product from
capturing any significant market share in America (Stahl, 2007).
The release of the NEC TurboGrafx-16 in 1987 heralded the arrival of 16-bit generation
game consoles. In contrast to the flat graphics of the previous generation, 16-bit games
offered a fast scrollable 2D playing field. Fundamentally, a 16-bit CPU featured data
word length that was twice that of the CPU from the preceding era. This new
improvement in word size expanded the addressable memory space and color palette of a
game console. Apart from increased bit ratings, the video game consoles of this
generation were also enhanced by more sophisticated multimedia chips capable of faster
2D animation and scrolling.
In 1990, a year after the release of the TurboGrafx-16, Sega leapfrogged Nintendo with
the release the Sega Genesis, a 16-bit game console with good multimedia capabilities.
Sega utilized its experience in the arcade business by converting many arcade games to
the Sega Genesis, which was welcomed by gamers and developers as a serious alternative
to the NES. Sega also targeted the Genesis to mature gamers with a large collection of
sport games. For the first two years, the sales of the Sega Genesis were brisk while
Nintendo was still firmly invested in the 8-bit game business. For a brief moment in
1993, Sega achieved a market share of 45% toppling rival Nintendo's 44% (Forster,
2005). This feat was short-lived as Nintendo eventually responded to its eroded market
share with the launch of its next-generation console called the Super Nintendo
Entertainment System (SNES).
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At the end of 1990, three years after the release of the TurboGrafx-16, Nintendo finally
countered the competition with the release of the SNES. Despite a late start, Nintendo
easily overtook the Genesis regaining the top spot of game consoles in the market.
Software sells hardware; Nintendo made up for the loss of market share with a series of
hit game titles from first and third parties, drawing many consumers to purchase the
SNES. The arrival of Sega as a serious competitor brought new threats and problems to
Nintendo, Nintendo's bargaining power diminished as it came under pressure from third-
party developers to loosen restrictions of its licensing agreements (Gallagher and Park,
2002). In addition, the company also came under increasing scrutiny by the government
over alleged antitrust practices forbidding third-developers from developing games on
other platforms (Kent, 2001). Under these developments, Nintendo had to revise its
licensing policies and allowed third-party developers greater autonomy in how they
wanted to develop and market their software. Despite reduced market power, Nintendo
still managed to sell 50 million units of SNES worldwide while Sega finished with only
30 million units at the end of the era (Forster, 2005).
2.9 The Fifth Generation (1993 - 2005)
The generation that succeeded the 16-bit generation was made up of both 32- and 64-bit
consoles. The technological shift from 16-bit to 32/64-bit era was huge in contrast with
previous technological change. Game consoles in this generation were enhanced by two
key technological innovations: three-dimensional (3D) graphics and compact disc (CD)
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technology. Together, these two innovations paved the way for new, improved game
experiences.
Although Philips was the company that introduced the first game console, the Odyssey,
to the market in the early 70's, the company disappeared from the market soon after the
collapse of market. In 1991, in true pioneering spirit, Philips released the first 32-bit
game console called the Philips CD-i. The product, featuring a CD drive, functioned not
only as a game console but as a music player, a movie player, and an interactive
educational tool. Poor third party support, failed marketing campaign, high introductory
price, and uncertain market positioning doomed the console. By the end of the era, the
machine garnered no more than 2% market share in the U.S. (Trachtenberg, 1996).
In the same year Philips CD-i was launched, Trip Hawkins, the flamboyant founder and
CEO of Electronic Arts, one of the largest game developers in the world, stepped down
from his position and founded 3DO. Hawkins had envisioned 3DO as the imminent
developer of a superior 32-bit game console as well as the first platform manufacturer
that operated on a business model providing the licensing of manufacturing rights of
hardware and software to partners. After almost two years of development, the 3DO
Interactive Multiplayer (IM) console was manufactured and released by 3DO partner
Matsushita in 1993. Like the Philips CD-i, the 3DO IM was promoted as an
entertainment system and used CD-ROM as a primary storage medium. The 3DO IM also
suffered from introductory high price - almost three times more expensive than a
competing console - which turned many potential adopters away. Some scholars like
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Gallagher and Park (2002), and Schilling (2003) argued that the demise of 3DO was
rooted in its business model. Even before the product was developed, a large number of
software and hardware developers had signed the licensing agreement, but the
proliferation of consoles and games never materialized after product launch due to weak
sales of the console. Traditionally, platform providers like Sega and Nintendo would use
game licensing fees to subsidize production cost of hardware, which enabled the
manufacturers to sell their products at cost or even at loss. The problem with 3DO
hardware partners was that they did not sell games and consequently were unwilling to
price the 3DO console at a much lower price for market penetration at the expense of
profit margin. High price diminished the appeal of the console and led to poor sales.
Without a large installed base, software developers had no incentive to produce games,
which ultimately led to the demise of the machine.
The Atari Jaguar was Atari's last attempt to regain the dominance that it once held. While
the Jaguar used a 16-bit CPU, its custom audio and visual chipset was 64-bit based. In
fact, Atari marketed the console as a 64-bit machine, hoping that the additional 32-bit
would differentiate the console from their competitors (Forster, 2005). Even though the
new chipset offered better performance than anything else on the market, developers
shunned the platform due to its complex architecture and poor support from Atari
(Forster, 2005). Despite a low price of $250, the console suffered a lackluster debut to the
market. Unable to regain market share, Atari finally exited the market in 1997.
41
Sega officially entered the 32-bit generation with the introduction of the Sega Saturn in
1994, four months prior to the Sony Playstation and sixteen months prior to the Nintendo
64 (N64). Sega had hoped that with features such as 3D graphics and CD capabilities,
which were well-aligned with the industry needs at that time, the Sega Saturn could
compete directly with upcoming products by rivals Nintendo and Sony. Sega shipped the
product four months earlier than the Sony Playstation, yet the company faced an uphill
battle when the Playstation was finally released to the market. The problem was that
Sega, in an effort to beat Sony in product release, problematically launched the Saturn
without coordinating with their developers who were caught off guard. The result was
few launch titles for the Sega Saturn (Stahl, 2007). Saturn eventually recovered from the
debacle, but the platform never garnered the size and variety of hit titles that Sony
Playstation and N64 did with their game library.
Sony launched the Sony Playstation four month later than the Sega Saturn and Sony
eventually outsold Sega two to one by 1996 (Gallagher and Park, 2002). The Playstation
was well positioned in the market. It functioned as most gainers expected: a top-
performing console capable of bringing the best game experience to the gamer. Sony,
learning from the Betamax debacle, realized the critical role complementary products
play in raising the value of owning a Sony Playstation (Coughlan, 2001). As a result,
Sony aggressively convinced third-party developers to produce games for the Playstation.
More importantly, Sony fine-tuned the development kit and made it easy for third-party
developers to maximize the 3D graphics capability of the hardware. By the end of 1996,
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the installed bases of Saturn, Playstation, and N64 were 1.2 million, 2.9 million, and 1.7
million respectively (Rigdon, 1997).
Sony's rapid gain of market share is remarkable because the Playstation marked Sony's
first foray into the video game industry, after Nintendo abandoned them in a joint project
to develop an add-on for the NES. The success of the Sony Playstation was largely
attributed to Sony's extensive distribution channel, expertise in consumer electronics and
entertainment makers, and broad value network of key partners and complementary
products.
The Nintendo 64 (N64) was the fruition of a collaboration between Nintendo and Silicon
Graphics, a company at that time considered the undisputed leader in 3D graphics
technology (Forster, 2005). The industry leader Nintendo attempted to repeat market
success with the Nintendo 64; but it stumbled when faced with the emergent technologies
of 3D and CD as well as the threat of the new entrant Sony. In the 32/64-bit generation,
only the Nintendo 64 (N64) and Atari Jaguar stuck with solid-state cartridge while the
rest of the industry migrated to CD. Nintendo justified the technical decision of not
migrating to CD by citing that the CD has slower access speed than the cartridge. But
Nintendo's real desire to stay with cartridge may have been motivated by higher licensing
revenue from the more expensive solid-state format (Kent, 2001). Despite partial
adoption of the new dominant design and few game titles, the console did reasonably
well in the first two years following its release.
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2.10 The Sixth Generation (1998 - Present)
In the sixth generation, console manufacturers fine-tuned their hardware and improved
3D performance to further enhance game play and allow for the development of more
realistic games. The competitive landscape in the sixth generation is about the same as
that of the previous generation with Sony, Sega, and Nintendo, once again, competing as
bitter rivals. However, we also witness Microsoft's surprising entry to the market with
the Xbox. The first console released in this generation was the Pippen, a console jointly
developed by Apple and Bandai, a Japanese toy manufacturer. Unfortunately, due to
mediocre technical performance and worse, the lack of software, fewer than 200,000
units of the Bandai Pippen were sold (Forster, 2005). Before long, that game console slid
to obscurity. On the other hand, Nintendo struggled to regain the market position that it
enjoyed in the 1980's and early 1990's. The incumbent leader, Sony, maintained its
leadership position with the highly successful Sony Playstation 2.
Reeling from lackluster market performance with the Saturn, Sega attempted a rebound
with the Dreamcast. Released in 1998, the Sega Dreamcast featured impressive hardware
specifications. For medium storage, Sega opted for a proprietary format called GD-ROM,
which has the ability to prevent piracy and to store up to 1.2 GB of content. Despite an
early lead, Sega was unable to attain a majority in market share. The reasons: the small
library of game titles and poor developer relationship. Just as Sega hastily released the
Saturn, the company abruptly retired it when it released the Dreamcast, angering many
game developers who had already invested money in developing Saturn games. Game
developers responded by abandoning the Dreamcast and went on to develop games on the
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Playstation 2 which had a much larger installed base (Stahl, 2007). Even though initial
sales of the console were strong, the Sega Dreamcast was eventually supplanted by the
Sony Playstation 2. The successor to the Sega Saturn, the Sega Dreamcast, achieved little
success despite remarkable hardware performance and early market entry. In the end,
Sega only achieved a meager market share of less than 5%. Sega, with its last hope of
restoring its former glory diminished, exited the home video game industry in 2001 and
focused solely on software game development (Schilling, 2003).
Sony maintained its market leadership in the sixth generation with the SonyPlaystation 2.
The game console sported not only 3D graphics acceleration but also DVD movie
playback and backward compatibility to older Playstation games. Consumers reacted
positively to the well-executed and prolonged market campaign and the game console
itself, buying over 20 million units of Playstation in the first year alone. Furthermore, the
Playstation 2 blurred the line between a game console and an entertainment center. Sony
succeeded with the Playstation 2 where Philips CD-i and 3DO Interactive Multiplayer
failed. What really differentiated the Sony Playstation 2 was 3D performance. At the core
of the game console was a 128-bit microprocessor Cell, which was jointly developed by
Sony, IBM, and Toshiba for optimized performance in floating calculations. Coupled
with a graphics chip from nVidia, the Sony Playstation was capable of animating
photorealistic 3D objects with accurate physical effects in real-time (Schilling, Chiu, and
Chou, 2001). Additionally, excellent development tools and good developer relationships
formed since the previous generation made game developers release hit titles that further
drove sales of the console.
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In 2001, Microsoft entered the game console market with the launch of the Xbox, a game
console that was built almost entirely on PC components. Considering Microsoft was a
new entrant to the market, it performed rather well by selling 20 million units of Xbox to
date (Forster, 2005). Microsoft's entry success can be attributed to the firm's
commitment to investing sufficient amount of capital to this new venture as well as
leveraging its 3D programming toolkit called DirectX.
After three generations of manufacturing game consoles with cartridges, Nintendo finally
embraced the optical medium with the launch of the Nintendo GameCube in 2002.
Unlike rivals' consoles, the Nintendo GameCube was never intended to be marketed as a
home entertainment systems and did not have DVD functionality. Instead, it used a
proprietary 8 cm wide optical medium with copy protection and storage of up to 1.5 GB
of information (Forster, 2005). The Playstation and Xbox primarily targeted the mature
gamer market segment, Nintendo wooed the younger crowd with a compact, cubic game
console. But underneath GameCube's cute appeal was a powerful PowerPC CPU and
audio-visual chipset giving the console the power to compete head on with other rivaling
consoles (Forster, 2005). Despite of the new direction in hardware design, Nintendo
failed to capture the market dominance the company enjoyed in the past. By the end of
2002, Nintendo managed to sell fewer than 7 million units of the console worldwide
(Schilling, 2003).
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3 Historical Analysis
The history of the video game console industry provides not only cases of successful and
failed business ventures but also insights into competition, technological innovations,
installed base, and complementary goods. Against this background, this section assesses
the industry of video game console from a historical perspective using relevant
theoretical frameworks.
3.1 Innovations and Dominant Design
Similar to the early phase of any industry, there was a great need for innovation in the
market to push the technological boundary of the video game console to the next level.
The need for innovation was driven by the need to address early design deficiencies with
a still low domain knowledge.
3.1.1 Emergence of Dominant Design in the Industry
The technological progression of the video game console industry is driven by
incremental innovations in two key areas of the hardware system: microprocessor and
media storage. In the industry, we see two notable dominant designs that emerged from
the market addressing user needs in these two areas. The first dominant design occurred
in 1976 and the second one in 1992.
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During the early days of the industry, when products were not well refined, video game
consoles suffered from three primary deficiencies. First, because most games were built
directly into the hardware, there were few to no game variants that could be exchanged
among console owners. Second, only one game genre (the ball and paddle) was available
to consumers. Third, almost all game at that time required two players to play against
each other. All these factors limited the attractiveness of the game console to the mass
market and hindered further market expansion.
There was incentive for companies to innovate and establish a dominant design for the
industry especially in the early phase of a technological progression. By 1976, advances
in semiconductor technology enabled programmability in electronic circuits through the
use of a microprocessor. Cost reduction in the manufacture of solid-state chips, further
pushed the use of memory in electronic circuits. Console manufacturers traditionally
depended on chip manufacturers for the supply of electronic components and knowledge.
Thus, it is not surprising that a semiconductor company, Fairchild Semiconductors,
released the game console that established the first dominant design in the video game
console industry. The release of Channel F addressed those early deficiencies adequately
with two important features:
" Its use of a general purpose microprocessor and certain specialized multimedia
chips in the console.
" Its games are stored on electronic media (cartridge) as add-ons to the system.1 3
13 A game cartridge is made of solid-state memory chips.
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This new design, the game logic and system execution, two critical functions of the game
console system, are now separated as software and hardware respectively. This new
approach to a video game system design enabled programmability and modularity in the
product design domain, and also allowed for the specialization of economic activities
where software studios focus on producing games while console manufacturers specialize
on the development and production of game consoles.
While the first dominant design was based on microprocessors and solid-state cartridges,
the second dominant design was based on:
* The use of highly-advanced 3D graphics processors.
" The storage of games on optical media.
The emergence of the second dominant design occurred sometime in the beginning of the
fifth generation. The integration of a powerful 3D graphics processor in most game
consoles in that generation allowed the creation of new game genres, such as first-person
shooter and 3D car racing. Gainers enticed by stunning 3D graphics began to favor
consoles that offered superior 3D capabilities and performance. However, 3D on its own
may not have enough added value for consumers to switch to the new generation of
consoles. Complementing the 3D graphics was the Compact Disc (CD), emerging as a
solution to increased storage needs. The biggest advantages of using CDs include lower
production cost and the ability to store massive amount of information. On the downside,
these CDs were not writeable, prone to piracy, and suffered from low access speed.
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Interestingly, both 3D and CD technologies benefited from each other's presence in the
market. As 3D games become more common, larger storage is needed to store the
increased graphical content, for which the CD was aptly suited. On the other hand, CD
enabled the creation of more complex games, which further drove demand for 3D games.
3.1.2 Adoption of Dominant Design and Competitiveness
Even though Fairchild Semiconductors was the first to adopt the first perceived dominant
design (microprocessor and cartridge), it did not benefit. Other competitors, notably
Atari, quickly adopted the dominant design and marketed their product more successfully
than Fairchild Semiconductors. Likewise, 3DO and Sega were the first in the market to
adopt the second dominant design (3D graphics processor and CD); but they too failed to
capitalize on the emergent product attributes. Why did an early lead in technological
leadership or even ownership of a dominant design fail to translate to market advantage?
In retrospect, one explanation offered is that most new markets are characterized by a
period of experimentation in establishing dominant design. From a system architecture
point of view, the arrangement of linkages between components, the design of individual
components, and the definition of product attributes can make or break a pioneer's
product design. The risk lies in defining a product attribute that may not meet the needs
of the customer. Moreover, once a firm commits to a design, the redesign may be
exorbitantly expensive. This presents an opportunity for later entrants to address design
issues by designing products that enhance "ideal" product attributes (Kerin, Varadarajan,
and Peterson; 1992).
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3.2 First-Mover Advantage
The microprocessor exerts a strong influence on the technological progression of the
video game console industry. Indeed, each time a new generation of microprocessor is
introduced, firms seize the opportunity to utilize the technology by releasing new
products and in doing so create market ecosystems that are distinct from those of
previous generations. The video game console industry, because of its short product
lifecycle, is divided into eras that correspond to their underlying microprocessor
architecture. A summary of market pioneers and leaders of each generation are presented
in the table below:
Generation Market Pioneers Market Leaders
1 st Magnavox Odyssey (1972) Magnavox Odyssey (1972)
2" nFairchild Channel F (1976) Atari 2600 (1977)
3 d Nintendo NES (1983) Nintendo NES (1983)
4 th NEC TurboGrafx-16 (1987) Nintendo SNES (1989)
5 th Philips CD-i (1991) Sony Playstation (1994)
6 th Bandai Pippin (1996) Sony Playstation 2 (2000)
Table 2 - Market Pioneers and Leaders
Table 2 illustrates how in the video game console industry, being first in the market does
not guarantee high market share. From the table, the market pioneer in the second, fourth,
fifth, and sixth generations, did not end up as the market leader. If theories for first-mover
advantage are right, why did the market pioneers not benefit from first-mover advantage?
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3.3 Complementary Assets
We have seen that even firms with strong technological knowledge and products, cannot
compete effectively without the rudimentary support of resources. Thus, companies
wishing to exploit innovations need to utilize complementary assets. Strength of
resources has little relevance if they are not complementary to technological innovation.
In terms of market competition, incumbent companies can use their existing proprietary
complementary assets to their advantage (Tripsas, 1997; Klepper and Simons, 2000). The
cost of reconfiguring their resource base may be another reason why incumbents resist
embracing new innovations. Conversely, later entrants, not handicapped by inertia, are
more likely to embrace technology. Successful entrants are the ones who preemptively
use complementary assets to their advantage to yield better than average performance.
Fundamentally, complementary assets support innovation from two fronts: technology
and commercialization (Teece, 1986). First, complementary assets, categorized as
process or technological, are assets that help to transform designs to products. Examples
of technological assets are manufacturing process, system integration knowledge, and
possession of key intellectual properties. Second, commercialization complementary
assets are resources of a firm that support the commercialization of innovations.
Examples of commercialization assets are brand name, reputation, value network, and
marketing capabilities.
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Technological Complementary Assets Commercialization Complementary Assets
* Manufacturing process * Brand name
* Knowledge base * Reputation
* Patents 0 Marketing capabilities
Table 3 - Examples of technological and commercialization complementary assets
The table below illustrates how various successful and less successful companies
throughout the history of the industry utilize technological and commercialization
complementary assets.
Generation Technological Commercialization(Time Platform Complementary Assets Complementary AssetsPeriod) _______
Magnavox eAcquired patent to the first TV game eDistribution channel in consumer
Odyssey electronics
1st eSubsidiary of a giant electronic
(1972- manufacturer
1979) ePoor marketing
Atari PONG eArcade expertise eDistribution channels to the arcade
market
Fairchild oExperience in electronic design eDirect access to manufacturing of
Channel F *Established as dominant design microprocessors and other electronic
components
oImage as a chip manufacturer
Atari 2600 eKiller applications in arcade converts *Access to distribution channel to the
like Space Invaders and Pac-man entertainment market
eFinancial backing from parent
company, Warner Communications
2nd Mattel eDelayed shipments of key add-ons eDistribution to the toy market
(1976 - Intellivision oEstablished brand name in
1984) children's market
Atari 5200 eBackward compatibility with Atari 2600 eHousehold brand name
games
eConsole design did not utilize new chips
and technology not as sophisticated as
competitors
Coleco eUse of advanced chips to push the eNew entrant to the video game
Colecovision performance of product industry, little experience in
electronics
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Nintendo NES *Lock-in chip *Excellent distribution channels
eBundling of killer application Super *Solid franchise with storyline and
Mario Brothers characters, e.g. Donkey Kong and
3rd Super Mario Brothers
(1984 - Sega Master *Arcade expertise *Poor marketing campaign
1991) System
Atari 7800 *Late market release eLow marketing budget which led to
oConsole was designed with dated poor marketing
technologies
NEC eVastly superior graphic processor eLack of brand name
TurboGrafx-16 *Early market release eDirect access to manufacturing of
'Excellent software support in Japan but microprocessors and other electronic
4th games had little relevance to the components
(1988 - American gainers
1997) Sega Genesis eApplications that push the limits of the *Good franchise, e.g. Sonic
console *Appeal to mature garners due to the
availability of sports games
Nintendo Super *Use of advanced graphics and sound *Excellent distribution channels
NES chips eFranchise
Philips CD-i *Maintain intellectual properties to CD *Strong brand recognition
technology 14 *Poor market positioning of the
product
3DO Interactive 'Good design eLarge number of partners
Multiplayer eLack of subsidy for hardware
manufacturers
Atari Jaguar *Use of sophisticated technology in *Loss of confidence by consumers in
console Atari products
5th Sega Saturn ePoor logistical coordination and *Suffered from weak brand after the
(1993 - relationship with third-party developers Playstation was released
2005) *Software did not push the limits of the
hardware
Sony 'Maintain intellectual properties to CD *Excellent distribution channels in
Playstation technology 14 entertainment and consumer
*Experience in chip design electronics
eAppeal to adult gamers
Nintendo N64 'Lock-in to cartridge technology *Recognized as a children game
*Joint venture with Silicon Graphics on machine
the development of graphics chips *Weak distribution channel to adult
gainers
Bandai Pippen *Poor design 'Bought manufacturing license from
Apple
Sega Dreamcast *Poor relationship with third developers eBrand name has been weaken by
Playstation
Sony *Joint venture with IBM and Toshiba in *Excellent brand name carried over
6th Playstation 2 the development processors from the previous generation
(1998- Well-designed console
Present) Nintendo 'Late release to the market *Brand name has been weaken byGameCube *Use of a closed propriety optical Playstation
medium
Microsoft Xbox *Experience in operating system 'Image as a monopolistic PC
'Offer good development kits software supplier
'Excellent distribution channels in
the PC game market
Table 4 - Summary of firms and their technological and commercialization complementary assets1 5
14 The prominent CD was the result of a joint venture between Philips and Sony in the 1970's.
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As Table 4 shows, there are numerous cases where possession of a similar
complementary asset by different firms in different periods of history resulted in different
outcomes. Both Atari and Sony used sophisticated chips in the design of their respective
products, the Jaguar and the Playstation 2 respectively. Yet, it was Sony that reaped the
benefit of applying a superior technology to its product. In terms of technological
complementary assets (resources that transform designs to products), Sony made
substantial efforts to make the Playstation 2 easy for developers to program by investing
time and money to create a resource base to support third-party development (e.g.
development kit and developers outreach programs). As a result, developers were
attracted to the platform and created not only more variety but higher-quality games that
pushed the limits of the hardware. Atari, on the other hand, did not offer the same level of
support to its developers. Clearly, the implication of such a case demonstrates simply
possessing a complementary asset is not enough to translate to strategic advantage;
proper alignment of assets to technology, product, and market conditions is required by
the firm to succeed.
15 Source: Adapted from: W. Forster. Encyclopedia of Game.Machines: Consoles, Handhelds, and Home
Computers 1972 -2005. Gameplan, Germany, 2005; A. Afuah and R. Grimaldi. Architectural Innovation
and the Attacker's Advantage from Complementary Assets: The Case of the Video Game Console Industry.
Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Working Paper Series, 2005.
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3.3.1 New Entrants Microsoft and Sony
In the business of video game consoles, Microsoft and Sony's debut in the market
demonstrated how both companies leveraged their existing complementary assets to
compete successfully in the new market. From a technological complementary assets
viewpoint, Sony's successful debut in the game console is attributed to its experience in
the design and development of consumer electronics (Schilling, 2005). Furthermore, as a
pioneer in the joint development of CD with Philips, not only did Sony have years of
expertise in this technology but the manufacturing capabilities to produce CD-ROM
drives at better economies of scope and scale than its competitors. When it came to
commercializing its first game console, the Playstation, Sony relied on its strongly
established distribution channels in the electronic and entertainment markets. Like Sony,
Microsoft was already an established-giant in another industrial sector when it entered the
market. The company also recognized the value of leveraging its complementary assets
early in the game. Microsoft leveraged its industry-winning 3D development suite
(DirectX) and value network with software developers, software retailers, and other
partners to enhance the market position of the firm. Particularly, by releasing a game
console that had architecture similar to the dominant Wintel-based personal computers,
game developers were able to convert PC games quickly and easily over to the Xbox.
While these initial complementary assets may not have been the only factors influencing
the two companies' successes, they certainly helped them to overcome initial entry to
market barriers.
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3.4 Network Effects
Since consoles contribute no value as a stand alone device, the sales of game consoles
depend heavily on the variety of games available (Clements and Ohashi, 2004). We
observed from the history of the industry that console manufacturers with a wider variety
of games and better game quality often have higher market share (Gallagher and Park,
2002; Schilling, 2003; Clements and Ohashi, 2004). Figure 3 illustrates this assertion.
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Figure 3 - Number of games reviewed based on the aggregate data of all game review websites via
Gamerankings.com 16
In the chart above, consoles with the largest installed base in their respective generation,
the Sony Playstation and the Sony Playstation 2, had the most variety of games. At the
16 Source: Gamerankings.com. Retrieved on March 18 to April 17 from http://www.gamerankings.com/.
Note: Gamerankings.com provide a database of aggregate game reviews obtained from over 50 game
review websites. The number of games shown here does not reflect the actual number of games released to
the market. The figures merely illustrate the number of games that were reviewed.
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same time, these platforms also captured the highest market share. The Sony Playstation
led with up to four times the game variety than its closest competitor and the Playstation
2 had almost twice the amount. In the fourth generation, both the SNES and the Sega
Genesis have about the same number of available game titles. These figures correspond
to the market share of the platforms, which the SNES garnered about 60% and the Sega
Genesis about 40%.
Generation of Video Console
Firm 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Magnavox 38% 5%
Coleco 10% <1%
Atari 28% 77% 1% <1% <1%
Sega 14% 34% 7% 8%
Nintendo 85% 57% 24% 15%
Sony 68% 62%
Microsoft 15%
Others 34% 8% <1% <9% <1% <1%
Table 5 - Market shares of major firms that competed in the video game console industry
The overall value of a game console increases with increasing game variety, console
manufacturers apply various strategies to maximize this phenomenon. Strategies that
directly control the distribution of software include:
* Internal game development - The consumption of a game console requires the
consumption of a game and a game console often comes bundled with at least one
game. As a result, many hardware companies built up and relied on their internal
software development group to produce games for bundling with the hardware at
product launch.
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* Franchising - Successful console manufacturers create lasting franchise to
appeal to targeted demographics of the market. For example, Nintendo was the
first to use rich storyline and characters in their early games. For example, the plot
in the Nintendo game Super Mario Bros., revolves around the player-controlled
character Mario who races through the Mushroom kingdom to save Princess
Peach. Since the mid 90's, licensing from entertainment and sports franchises are
used extensively by game developers. Licensing content from entertainment and
sports franchises have the complementary effect of benefiting the game publishers
by differentiating their products in the market while games featuring captive
content stimulate demand for these franchises (Coughlan, 2000; Crandall and
Sidak, 2006).
* Exclusive titles - Securing exclusive rights to games, especially ones that are are
well received by the market (e.g. Final Fantasy) can greatly enhance indirect
network effects.
* Game development - Availability of good development tools and software
libraries greatly enhances development productivity, in turn can leading to less
costly and faster game development.
There are other strategies to enhance network effects without direct control of the
software and these are:
* Penetration pricing - The platform provider offers a low introductory price,
which allows for the build up of an installed base. As market share grows,
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software sales increase, making the platform more attractive for developers to
create more variety of games. Console manufacturers derive their revenues from
license contracts in addition to revenues generated from the sales of consoles. In
the game console business, most console manufacturers derived much higher
revenue from licensing than from the sale of consoles. In fact, console
manufacturers have known to actually sell consoles at a loss, in order to penetrate
the market (Becker and Wilcox, 2001; Wildstrom, 2001). Console manufacturers
make up for such losses with revenues from licensing, which typically has higher
profit margin.
* Early mover in the market - Early move in the market helps the firm to grow
the installed base early. However, first mover in this industry as explained
previously does not guarantee success.
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4 The System Dynamics Analysis
So far we have taken an inductive-driven approach to examining the determinants to
competitive success in the video game console industry. The next step is to use a holistic-
driven analysis to understand how determinants in the industry interact with one another.
In particular, a system dynamics model created to allow us to identify key determinants
and understand the underlying dynamics using discussions from the previous chapter as
well as information from reviewed literature. The purpose of a system dynamics model is
not to predict future behavior of the system but rather to better allow us to examine the
complex interrelationships that we may have missed in our earlier analysis.
Readers who are unfamiliar with the concepts of system dynamics can refer to Appendix
A for an overview of system dynamics.
4.1 The Self-Reinforcing Indirect Network Effects
Before we delve into the discussion of the model, let us first use the principles of system
dynamics to explain the self-reinforcing effect of indirect network effects in the video
game console industry. In the industry, where the base good relies on the availability of
complementary goods, the installed base of complementary goods is a factor that cannot
be ignored. As the market grows, it becomes more important to have a consistent strategy
to grow the installed user base. Figure 4 highlights the linkages of indirect network effect
in the game console market. All causal links in the network effect loop are positive.
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Consequently, the direction of any change in the system is reinforced. If one of the causal
links in the self-reinforcing loop exhibits some form of amplification, a small change
anywhere along the loop gets amplified over and over again. Companies that exploit
these positive feedback loops (virtuous cycle) early can stand to yield better than average
performance in growth and market share.17 As more people become users of a product,
the appeal of the product grows, which attracts more people to purchase the product.
Simultaneously, a wide adoption of the product catches the attention of third-party
developers who see a market potential in developing games for that platform. As more
software developers enter the market, a wider variety of software for the platform is
produced. Furthermore, other determinants such as a higher proportion of quality games
attracts more people to adopt the console (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Clements and Ohashi,
2005). As the installed base grows, the cost of switching to a substitute product becomes
prohibitively expensive, further reinforcing lock-in. Under this scenario, the effects of
early decisions are substantially amplified. This is why many platform providers exploit
network effects as they release their game console to the market.18
" Self-reinforcing positive feedback loops can also amplify the effects of bad decisions early (vicious
cycle) that eventually lead to worse than average market performance for a firm.
1S See Section Network Effects in Chapter Three for a detailed analysis of the strategies used by companies
to exploit indirect network effects.
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Figure 4 - The self-reinforcing indirect network effect loop
4.2 Methodology
The model created for this thesis is adapted from the system dynamics model on learning
effects of a firm, as described in the paper by Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker, and
Newman (2002). The model was modified by removing most of the original feedback
loops describing the production of a firm, as they have little relevance in our
investigation. The model was then extended on Vensim DSS19 by including endogenous
and exogenous competitive factors of the video game console industry.
19 A software application program used for the creation and simulation of system dynamics simulation
models. Information available at http://www.vensim.com/.
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4.3 Model Structure
The system dynamics model represents a generation of the video game console
20 21industry. It captures the following feedback loops, identified as the most critical
drivers to business growth in a video game console manufacturer:
" Diffusion of video game consoles.
" Attractiveness of video game console.
" Drivers to the attractiveness of video game console.
o Price and price elasticity of demand.
o Perception of technology.
o Indirect network effects (variety of games).
o Random events and noise.
We simulate the model against the fifth generation of the video game console market by
using empirical data of price, price elasticity, and technology perception of consoles
competing in that market.
20 The diagrams shown in this chapter may be modified cosmetically from the actual model by excluding
certain variables that are used solely for calibration purposes.
21 The actual Vensim model uses a feature of Vensim DSS called subscripts. According to Vensim manual:
"Subscripts allow a single variable to represent more than one thing ... Subscripts do not appear in
sketches. Sketches represent structure, and subscripts are a convenient way of replicating structure. The
sketch maintains a simpler and less cluttered view of a model by not distinguishing subscripted and
unsubscripted variables." (Ventana, 2006) The application of subscripts allows a group of companies
competing in a generation to be represented as an array in Vensim.
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4.3.1 Key Assumptions
The following assumptions were made in the construction of the model:
" Owners who discard their older consoles will migrate to newer consoles.
" All drivers to console attractiveness have equally weighted influences on the
overall console attractiveness.
" The demand curve of game console is linear.
4.3.2 Diffusion of Video Game Consoles
The standard supply and demand model in microeconomics describes the commercial
interactions between the supplier and the consumer. When the price of a good falls, the
demand by consumers for that good increases. These fundamental market interactions are
described in the top left section of the model. The variables Lowest Price (minimum price
among the three consoles) and Demand Curve Slope are used to determine the consumers
demand. The stock and flow on the right section of the diagram describes the adoption of
fifth generation consoles. The adoption rate is controlled by the feedback information
originating from stocks Non Adopters and Cumulative Adopters. As more people adopt
the game console, the rate of adoption slows. Moreover, the adoption rate is also driven
by other factors, such as word of mouth (Word of Mouth Strength) and natural rate
adoption of the product (Innovator Adoption Fraction). Not all owners of previous
consoles are willing to adopt the newer consoles immediately and the adoption rate of
newer consoles is low during the early phase of the industry. A stock, represented by
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variables Adopters of Previous Generation Console and Adopters of Previous Generation
Console Discard Rate, captures the influences of the previous generation on the adoption
of newer consoles.
The dynamics of adoption and demand for a game console are captured in the causal loop
diagram below:
Reference Industry Reference Price for <Price>
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Lowest Price Initial Diffusion
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Figure 5 - Diffusion of video game consoles
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A portion of this sub-model is based on Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker, and Newman's
(2002) model on product adoption and demand. The definitions of key variables are
presented in the table below:
Variables Description
Cumulative Adopters Cumulative number of adopters of the console.
Adoption Rate The rate at which consumers adopt the console.
Innovator Adoption Fraction The fractional rate per year that non-adopters will adopt the product.
Non Adopters Consumers who have not adopted the console.
Industry Demand The number of consumers in the population who will in equilibrium
choose to purchase the product as a function of the minimum price
available in the market.
Population Total population of potential adopters.
Demand Curve Slope The slope of the demand curve as a function of the price elasticity at
the reference price level.
Reference Population Potential number of consumers willing to purchase the product at
reference price.
Reference Price for Demand Price at which the potential adopter population equates the reference
population.
Adopters of Previous Generation The number of people who adopt a console from the previous
generation.
Adopters of Previous Generation The rate at which people discard their older consoles.
Discard Rate
Table 6 - Descriptions of variables represented in the diffusion of video game console causal loop
diagram 22
22 Some descriptions were taken directly from Sterman, Henderson, Beinhocker, and Newman's (2002)
model.
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4.3.3 Attractiveness of video game console
The dynamics of the attractiveness and the installed base of a video game console are
captured in the causal loop diagram below:
Entry to Market Average Product
Life of Console
Installed
Shipments Base Discard Rate
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Console Console Attractiveness>
Total Attractiveness
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<Installed Base> __ Total InstalledBase
Figure 6 - The video game console market
The variable Attractiveness of Console represents the attractiveness of a game console to
non-adopters. In our model, the attractiveness of a console depends on four other
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attributes, which are collectively known as the drivers of console attractiveness. These
four attributes are:
" Price.
" Perceived technology.
" Variety of games.
" Random noise - "the luck factor."
The mathematical relationship between the attractiveness of a console and its
determinants is shown as:
Attractiveness of Console, = Price Attractivenessi x
Technology Attractiveness x
Game Attractiveness x
Random Noise
All drivers of console attractiveness are normalized with a relevant reference value
ensuring that the values reflect meaningful relative strength with respect to the standard
or an acceptable reference value. The descriptions of other drivers of console
attractiveness are provided in subsequent causal loop diagrams. The parameter Random
Events and Noise is simulated with a random generator function in Vensim where each
firm receives an unique random seed value.
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The definitions of key variables are presented in the following table:
Variables Description
Entry to Market Firm's entry to market.
Installed Base Cumulative number of consoles currently in the market.
Discard Rate Rate at which consoles are discarded by users.
Shipments Rate at which consoles are sold by a company.
Order Share The attractiveness of a console relative to other firms' consoles.
Total Attractiveness of the The total attractiveness of all consoles.
Industry
Attractiveness of Console The attractiveness of a game console to the non-adopter.
Price on Console Attractiveness Effects of price on the overall console attractiveness.
Technology on Console Effects of perceived technology on the overall console attractiveness.
Attractiveness
Games on Console Attractiveness Indirect network effects of games on the overall console
attractiveness.
Random Events and Noise on Effects of random events and exogenous noise on the overall console
Console Attractiveness attractiveness. The luck factor.
Table 7 - Descriptions of variables represented in the diffusion of video game console causal loop
diagram
The order share of a firm, which is defined as the fraction of the industry order going to
that firm, is determined by the strength of attractiveness of a game console relative to the
rest of the competition. The following expression shows the relationship:
Order Share. = Attractiveness of a Console
(2)Attractiveness of a Console,
The rationale for this relationship is that the stronger the console attractiveness relative to
the competition the larger portion of sales of that console.
4.3.4 Indirect Network Effects
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The dynamics of indirect network effects on attractiveness of a console are captured in
the causal loop diagram below:
Threshold
Variety ofG
V
Co
Sensiv
<Entry to Market>
<IndustryAvrg
ofofa
Ins,'e
Base of
Shipments of Games Discard Rate of
Games Games
of
amms
ariety of Games on Varit Elasticit of
nsole Attractiveness Demand
Variety of
yVariety of Gas
amnes
Expected Software hIntroduc Rate of
Market Potential New ame
<Instaled Base>
Adjustment Time
Figure 7 - The effect of software (Games) on sales of consoles
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The definitions of key variables are presented in the following table:
Variables Description
Games on Console Attractiveness Effects of games on the overall console attractiveness.
Threshold of Installed Base on Reference size of installed base to cause significant network effect.
Variety of Games
Sensitivity Variety of Games Strength of the effect.
Variety of Games The cumulative number of games title in the market.
Introductory Rate of New Games The rate at which new games and released to the market.
Expected Software Market Developers' perception of the market potential as a motivating factor
Potential for developers to produce games.
Variety Elasticity of Demand Responsiveness of demand with respect to game variety.
Installed Base of Games Cumulative number of games currently in the market.
Shipments of Games Rate at which games are sold by all software companies.
Discard Rate of Games Rate at which games are discarded by all software companies.
Game Quality The perceived quality of games.
Table 8 - Descriptions of variables represented in the indirect network effects console causal loop
diagram
Our indirect network effect (Games on Console Attractiveness) uses an adapted version
of a similar mathematical function found in Chapter 10 of Sterman's book Business
Dynamics (2000). The mathematical relationship is expressed as:
Games Attractiveness, = exp
Sensitivity Variety
of Games x Game Variety, x Game Quality
Threshold of Variety
of Games
In markets that exhibit strong indirect network effects, the adoption of complementary
products by other users can benefit the base product directly. The network effects
influencing console attractiveness can be approximated as an exponential function (3).
The mathematical relationship is by no means complete. In fact, for a more detailed
analysis, Sterman (2000) recommends constructing a set of "nonlinear functions that
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(3)
would saturate for high levels of installed base, representing the eventual dominance of
diminishing returns as the installed base becomes very large." For now, this crude
expression gives a reasonable estimation of the system response. The relationship above
also incorporates the variable Game Quality to simulate the effect of game quality on
game attractiveness. The data for Game Quality (Figure 8) are taken from the website
www.gamerankings.com, which aggregates game ratings from over fifty game review
websites. Unfortunately, it was not possible to retrieve game ratings by year as the
website does not facilitate data query for games reviewed before the year 2000. As a
result, Game Quality is represented only as a constant.
Figure 8 - The average game ratings of games aggregated from various game review websites via
Gamerankings.com 2 3
23 See Appendix B for detailed presentation of distribution of game ratings by platform.
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4.3.5 Price and Price Elasticity of Demand
The dynamics of price and its affect on the attractiveness of a console is captured in the
causal loop diagram overleaf:
Price
Price on
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Attractiveness
Price Elasticity
of Demand
Reference Price
Figure 9 - Price on the attractiveness of console
The input to variable Price uses the dynamic price of three consoles competing in the
fifth generation market. The prices throughout the marketing period are summarized in
Table 9.
Platform Price (US )
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Nintendo 64 (N64) 199.61 159.33 138.06 121.92 105.23 90.09 84.42
Sony Playstation 301.67 235.15 158.03 138.79 117.84 99.59 99.63 109.31
Sega Saturn 369.58 233.98 172.71 77.86 40.3 31.65 36.14
Table 9 - Prices of fifth generation game consoles 24
Price elasticity of demand is included in the model to represent the magnitude of demand
change in response to a unit change in price. We model price elasticity as the variable
24 Source: M. Clements and H. Ohashi. Indirect Network Effects and the Product Cycle: Video Games in
the U.S., 1994-2002. The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 53, Issue 4, pp. 515-542, 2005.
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Price Elasticity of Demand.25 More importantly, price elasticity of demand in each
console is known to vary with time. In the seminal work by Clements and Ohashi, the
authors found that price elasticity of demand in the fifth generation of the video game
console industry was known to be dynamic. They explain: "We find that lowering price is
particularly effective near the beginning of the product cycle: Demand for hardware is
particularly elastic with respect to price at the beginning of the cycle ... At the end of the
cycle, when a hardware standard is becoming out-of-date relative to newer competitors,
the elasticity of hardware demand with respect to both price and software variety is low"
(Clements and Ohashi, 2004). Dynamic price elasticity proves to be useful as we can now
model the dynamics of consumers' response to price change at any given time.
Platform Elasticities 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Avera e
Price (E,) -4.38 -3.45 -2.95 -2.55 -2.13 -1.77 -1.65 -2.10
N64 Software Variety E,) 0.02 0.11 0.40 0.90 1.34 1.55 1.44 0.64
Share (-EwE0) 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.35 0.63 0.88 0.87 0.32
Price (E,) -8.40 -5.19 -3.74 -1.66 -0.84 -0.64 -0.71 0.00 -2.35
Saturn Software Variety (E,) 0.09 0.53 1.08 1.19 0.90 0.47 0.24 0.00 0.50
Share - 0.01 0.10 0.29 0.72 1.07 0.73 0.34 0.00 0.36
Price (F,) -6.83 -5.22 -3.43 -2.96 -2.46 -2.01 -1.96 -2.14 -3.00
Playstation Software Variety CE,) 0.16 0.65 1.59 2.47 3.40 4.49 5.42 5.09 2.59
Share (-E/F,) 0.02 0.12 0.46 0.83 1.38 2.23 2.77 2.38 1.13
Table 10 - Price and Software Variety Elasticities of Game Consoles 26
2 5 Price elasticity of demand was hastily implemented in the model. Although it offers a reasonable
estimation of the system, a better way is to incorporate price elasticity of demand directly to the variable
Demand Curve Slope. This modification would have been cleaner and more accurate.2 6 Source: M. Clements and H. Ohashi. Indirect Network Effects and the Product Cycle: Video Games in
the US., 1994-2002. The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 53, Issue 4, pp. 515-542, 2005.
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4.4 Perception of Technology
The dynamics of the perception of technology and its affect on the attractiveness of a
console are captured in the causal loop diagram overleaf:
Preception of
Previous Generation
Technology Level
Preception ofNext
Generation Technology
Level
Relative Console
Technological
Strength
Preception of
Current Generation
Technology Level
Technology on
Console
Attractiveness
Reference
Technology
Figure 10 - Perception of technology
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We approximate the Relative Console Technological Strengths by performing a
comparative analysis of technical strengths and weaknesses of all three consoles (Table
11).
Model Sega Saturn Sony Playstation Nintendo 64
Acronym SAT PS N64
Year Released 1994 1995 1996
CPU
Model 2x Hitachi SH2 LSI/MIPS R3000A NEC/MIPS R4300i
Type 32-bit RISC 32-bit RISC 32/64-bit RISC
Clock Speed 28.6 Mhz each 33.8 Mhz 93.75 Mhz
Benchmark 25 MIPS each 33.8 MIPS 100 MIPS
Memory
Type SDRAM/DRAM SDRAM/DRAM Rambus DRAM
Main RAM 2 MB 2 MB 4.5 MB
Video RAM 1.5 MB 1 MB 1027
Storage
Type CD CD ROM (cartridge)
Size 600 MB 1600 MB 64 MB
Graphics
GPU VDP1, VDP2 GPU SGI/Nintendo RCP
Clock Speed 7.2 Mhz 62.5 Mhz
Normal Resolution 320 x 224 256 x 240 320 x 240
Highest Resolution 704 x 480 640 x 480 (interlaced) 640 x 480 (interlaced)
Color Depth 24-bit 24-bit 32-bit
Pixel Transfer 0.02 G/s
3D Graphics
Geometry Processor SCU, DSP GTE RCP
Speed 66 Mhz
Sound
Processor SCSP, 68EC000 CPU, DSP SPDP (part of CPU)
Channels 32 PCM and FM 24 ADPCM up to 24 ADPCM2
Others
Readers' Rating (out of
10) 4 4.5 5
Table 11 - Technical specifications of fifth generation game consoles 29
27 Unified memory architecture - no dedicated memory for video or sound.28 Each channel takes up 1% of coprocessor rendering time.
29 Source: W. Forster. Encyclopedia of Game.Machines: Consoles, Handhelds, and Home Computers 1972
-2005. Gameplan, Germany, 2005.
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The Relative Console Technological Strengths are finalized using data from Table 11.
Model Sega Saturn Sony Playstation Nintendo 64
Relative Console 0.75 0.90 1.00
Technological Strength .9.
Table 12 - Relative Console Technological Strengths of fifth generation game consoles
4.5 Model Inputs
The market release dates of consoles are programmed into the model. The first console
that appeared in the market, Sega Saturn, is assigned with time t = 0 years. The Sony
Playstation and the Nintendo 64 entered the market at t = 0.25 year and t = 1.25 years
respectively. Finally, in approximate terms, other hypothetical inputs supplied to the
model are summarized as follow:
Variables Values
Average Product Life of Console 4
Average Product Life of a Game 2
Reference Price for Demand (price equilibrium) $300
Population 200 million
Time Period 8 years
Table 13 - Hypothetical inputs to the model
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4.6 Simulation Results
We simulated the model for 8 years corresponding to the duration of the fifth generation.
This section highlights some of the results from our simulation runs. Figure 11 shows the
simulated installed base of various consoles competing in the market.
Installed Base
120 M
90M
60M
30 M
0
0 1 2 4
Tine (Year)
5 6 7
Instaed Base[PS]: Ciurent
Instaled Base[N64]: Curent
Instaed Base[SAT]: Cwrent
Figure 11 - Simulated results showing installed Bases of fifth generation game consoles
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While the absolute values of market size obtained from the simulation runs differ
considerably from real world values, the simulated relative market shares and trends
(Figure 11) are positively correlated to the real world values and trends (Figure 12).
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. 25.00
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Year
-4- Playstation -s-N64 -a-Satum
Figure 12 - Actual cumulative shipments of 5 'h generation consoles
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The drivers of console attractiveness are plotted in Figure 13.
Technology on Console Attractiveness
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Figure 13 - Dynamic responses of individual components of console attractiveness
The curve depicting Technology on Console Attractiveness shows the attractiveness of
console in terms of its technological attributes. The shape of the curve is attributed to he
initial ramp-up of favorable perception of console due to preannouncements and
marketing leading to product release. The curve then levels off at a level that corresponds
to the console's relative technical performance. Towards the end of the duration, the
curve declines as consoles begin to lose their technical appeal to newer consoles. Indirect
network effects curve shows an exponential type of growth in attractiveness. The chart
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clearly shows that as the installed base grows, the attractiveness of consoles due to
network effects grows more than proportionately. The curve on Price on Console
Attractiveness is a direct reflection of the actual prices of the consoles. 30 Combining the
effects of all individual components, we get the overall console attractiveness
(Attractiveness of Console), which can be seen in Figure 14.
Overall Console Attactiveness
Why drop in abrOYMsS?
Whythe divergeae?.
b&n 4(N4)
----- - --- - ----- 
-
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6 70 1 2 3 4 5.
Time (Year)
Attractiveness diCoasck[PS: Curent
Attractiveness ofCoscle[N64J: Current
Attractiveness of Cosole[SAT]: Current
Figure 14 - The overall console attractiveness
S
4.7 New Questions
The simulation runs have produced some interesting results. The simple system model
provided a reasonable approximation of the actual case of the competitive market
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0.06
0.045
0.03
0.015
0
30 Actual prices are found in Table 9.
operating in the fifth generation of video game console by comparing Figure 11 and
Figure 12. However, it also raises two new questions:
* Why did Sega Saturn despite being the first mover, not yield satisfactory market
performance?
" Soon after Nintendo 64 was released, the product caught up to the Sony
Playstation in terms of console attractiveness, but by the fifth year Nintendo 64's
appeal to consumers faltered. Why?
The following sections address these questions.
4.7.1 Perception of Technology and Pricing
1. Why did Sega despite being the first mover, did not yield satisfactory market
performance?
Even though Sega enjoyed a ten month lead over Sony on product release, the market
perception of the Sony Playstation was more favorable because the product had stronger
perceived technical performance relative to the Sega Saturn. The Playstation's perceived
technological attractiveness is boosted by performance while the Saturn's perceived
technological attractiveness by early lead-time. Taken together the two effects roughly
balance each other out. Therefore, for the first year, both machines have similar
technological appeal to consumers. The technological attractiveness of the current
products did not reach saturation till the second year (Figure 13). Furthermore, because of
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marginal perceived performance gain, uncertain technological standard, or high switching
cost. Consumers may choose to defer purchase until the Sony Playstation console is
released to the market, especially if the product is seen to offer more value.
When the Sega Saturn was launched, it had a price tag of $369.58. In contrast, the Sony
Playstation was introduced with a price of $301.67 (Table 9Table 14). The price elasticity
for Sega Saturn and Sony Playstation in the first year were -6.83 and -8.40 respectively
(Table 10), making the Sega Saturn more price elastic than the Sony Playstation. As with
any highly elastic good, consumers are likely to find substitute goods when the price is
deemed high. So despite early lead, Sega was unable to exploit early lock-in associated
with indirect network effects as demand for its product lowered due to weaker perceived
technological performance, high price, and high price elasticity relative to those of the
Sony Playstation. As the market expanded, the sales of Sony Playstation surged. By
1996, Playstation's installed base outgrew Saturn's installed base. The rate of installed
base growth of Sony Playstation is higher than the Sega Saturn, the indirect network
effects for the Sony Playstation became significant early enough to cause even further
lead in market share over Sega.
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4.7.2 Sensitivity to Strategic Decisions
2. Soon after Nintendo 64 was released, the product caught up to the Sony
Playstation in terms of console attractiveness, but by the fifth year Nintendo 64's
appeal to consumers faltered. Why?
In terms of technical attractiveness, the Nintendo 64 has a slight edge over the Sony
Playstation (N64 was rated at 1.0 and Sony Playstation at 0.9). Sony, on the other hand,
has a large installed base and led Nintendo by a year early in product (Figure 11). When
the Nintendo 64 was finally released, it was priced $35.54 lower than the Sony
Playstation. Despite having a lower price elasticity (Figure 15), the lower introductory
price and the apparent technological strength of the N64 beget strong demand for the
product by consumers. As competition between Sony and Nintendo intensifies, the two
rivals locked in a price war. For the next two years, there were no significant differences
in the prices between the two consoles (Table 14).
Platform Price US$)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Nintendo 64 (N64) 199.61 159.33 138.06 121.92 105.23 90.09 84.42
Sony Playstation 301.67 235.15 158.03 138.79 117.84 99.59 99.63 109.31
Price Difference N/A -35.54 1.3 -0.73 4.08 5.64 -9.54 -24.89
Table 14 - Price Differences between N64 and Playstation
However, in 1999, we see a slight dip in price elasticity for Nintendo 64 (Figure 15). That
same year Sony dropped the price of the Playstation $4.08 below that of the Nintendo 64.
While these changes may seem small, the virtuous cycles (as described in section The
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Self-Reinforcing Indirect Network Effects) in the system can amplify the effects of these
changes substantially to cause a very different outcome. By the following year, the
attractiveness of both consoles began to diverge. This may explain the drop in the
variable Attractiveness of Console at t = 5.25 years. Nintendo finally reacted in 2001 by
aggressively lowering prices, but it was already too late to reverse the self-reinforcing
effects.
0.00-
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-+-N64 -U-Playsation
Figure 15 - Changing price elasticities of N64 and Playstation
People's response to price changes differ over time even though other factors stay the
same. In retrospect, it is easy to spot the change in price elasticity. In the real scenario,
consumers' preferences and market conditions may go unnoticed. Indeed, it may be
difficult even to define the predictors of shifting price elasticity in the game console
market.
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5 Conclusions and Implications
This chapter summarizes the findings from the thesis and concludes with implications
and suggestions for companies wishing to achieve competitive success in the video game
console industry.
5.1 Policy Implications
The U.S. antitrust law under the Sherman Antitrust Act addresses firms that engage in
practices that prevent or reduce competition in a market. Anti-competitive practices
relevant to the video game console industry include dumping, barriers to entry, price
fixing, and product tying. The discussion on the video game console industry so far has
been done through the lens of microeconomics and strategic management. What are the
policy implications from this study? After all, the video game console industry is a highly
competitive market system with competing firms driven to building and sustaining large
market share. Can we expect firms competing in the video game console industry to
behave in manners that are culpable of reducing competition in the market? In various
ways, many of the firms that compete in the video game console industry fit into the
traditional definition of a monopolist. Most firms in the industry have market power in
some form or another. All hardware products in the industry are differentiated, sold
below marginal cost, and may have exclusive game titles. These characteristics appear to
violate the behavioral standards of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (Schmalensee, 2000).
However, in a Schumpeterian-based industry, incumbent products face constant threats of
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newer products that arise from rapid technological change. The case of the video game
console industry illustrates that firms with market power are vulnerable to competitive
threats since market leaders are not known to last more than two market generations.
Indeed, many economists suggest factoring rapid technological innovation into the
existing antitrust laws in the U.S. to better reflect the competitive landscape in today's
market (Ordover and Willig, 1985; Schmalensee, 2000; Lipsky, 2001). In terms of price
fixing, studies examining the lag effects of platform providers' pricing and advertising
decisions indicate there are no significant signs of concerted efforts of price coordination
(Shankar and Bayus, 2002). According to Shankar and Bayus (2002) "industry analysts
and government antitrust documents indicate that firms in the video game industry do
indeed have short planning horizons and do not usually consider any inter-temporal
effects of price and advertising in their decisions."
5.2 Further Research
The rapid, dramatic turnover of market leadership and technological standards in the
video game console industry offers plenty of opportunities for future work by applying
different theoretical frameworks. In particular, does an industry characterized by the
overlapping of two or more generations of differing technological standards overturn a
traditional theoretical model of innovation? On the other hand, more thorough and in-
depth analyses of the investigated areas would greatly contribute to the understanding of
market competition, innovation diffusion, and the dynamics operating in the industry.
There is no denying that this thesis benefited from previous research in this industry
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(Gallagher and Park, 2002; Schillings, 2003; Clements and Ohashi, 2005). Insights into
how Sony beat Sega despite being four months late in product launch and how a small
price drop by Sony in crucial moments resulted in significant market share growth, would
not had been possible without the data provided by Clements and Ohashi (2005).
Therefore, further research in extending previous studies would be most beneficial in the
near future in order to bring further clarity and coherence to the subject.
5.3 The Evolution of the Industry
One area that requires further accuracy and consistency is the market evolution of the
video game console industry. While our findings in this area are startling, they are also
inconclusive due to limited data. Nonetheless, the findings are significant enough to
warrant a brief explanation.
The Abernathy-Utterback model (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978) was developed in
1978 to describe the evolution of an innovative industry. The authors observed the
survival of firms and the final structure of an industry are profoundly influenced by
business cycles and technological standards. The period following the market's inception
is characterized by market turbulence and a high level of uncertainty in technology. In
this period, the rate of innovation is highest as firms experiment with new technological
ideas and designs. As the industry evolves, it transitions into a period of firms racing to
devise new designs to differentiate their products from those of their competitors. Also
during this period the number of firms entering the market increases substantially. As
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technological innovations converge towards a dominant design, a well-defined market
will begin to take shape (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Once a design becomes
dominant, firms shift focus from product differentiation to product performance and
process efficiency. At this point in the evolution, the creation and acquisition of
complementary assets becomes critical for firms to compete in the market (Suarez and
Utterback, 1995).
The video game industry shows a noteworthy account of rapid growth and industrial
chaos. While portions of the industrial evolution of the video game console industry are
consistent with the Abemathy-Utterback model, certain instances observed in the
industry history deviate from the theoretical model.
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Figure 16 - Number of firms (including clone makers) competing in the world video game console
markee'
Between 1972 and 1976, several companies entered the market and experimented with
different designs. Most games developed during this phase of the industry were of the
ball-and-paddle game genre, though some companies engaged in product differentiation.
For instance, Atari differentiated its game PONG with improved animation and sound
while retaining its less complicated game rules. As company founder Bushnell later
explained, PONG is "something so simple that any drunk in a bar could play" (Kent,
2001). Consistent with Abernathy-Utterback model, a period of firms entering the market
in the early phases are followed by a period of firm exits. However, the video game
industry deviates from the model in the timing of the dominant design, and the timing of
31 Source: Number of companies compiled and estimated from: Classic Consoles Center,
http://www.dieterkoenig.at/ccc; Console Database - http://www.consoledatabase.com/; Ultimate Console
Database - http://www.ultimateconsoledatabase.com/.
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firm entries and exits. Unlike the pattern of firm participation found in other industries
(Suirez and Utterback, 1995; Christensen, Suirez, and Utterback, 1998), the emergence
of dominant designs in the video game industry in 1976 and 1992 (Gallagher and Park,
2002; Schilling, 2003) did not trigger a wave of firms exiting the industry but instead
stimulated a surge of companies entering the market. This deviation may be attributed to
the fact that video game consoles are a complex system made up of different
technological subsystems. At some level, innovations in video game consoles require
strong coordination and compatibility with other products such as semiconductor
components and software (Sudrez, 2003). Lastly, the weak regime of appropriability
present in the industry could effectively reduce the technological advantage of the
intellectual properties certain firms held and lead to imitators releasing clones into the
market. Together these factors reduced the rate of technological and market growth.
Unfortunately, the study of the video game console market evolution is inconclusive as
about a third of the data are missing the exit dates for firms participating in the market.
For these firms with missing exit dates, we determine their values with a date that is five
years after market entry. The five year value is averaged and approximated from known
values.
Another anomaly in the growth of the video game market is the occurrence of a market
crash in 1983. Unfortunately, due to the lack of adequate evidence, no conclusive link
between the event, which effectively wiped out almost all companies competing in the
market, and theories of dominant design can be established. The evolution of the video
game console industry makes an intriguing case for broadening our understanding of
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dominant design and firm survivability in the competitive environment of an industry.
Unfortunately, due to time constraints and limitation of data in the public domain,32
further work is needed to obtain and apply a more complete, coherent picture and further
shed light on this subject.
5.3.1 Model Limitations and Extensions
The system dynamic model would greatly benefit from more refinements and extensions.
The model offers a reasonable approximate of the market system, but it is limited in what
it can provide. The model structure needs further improvements and the application of
additional empirical data. The following suggestions are offered to improve the system
dynamics model:
* Many mathematical relationships in the system dynamic model are used
conveniently. While they offer reasonable approximation, they are not robust
enough for an in-depth analysis.
* Dynamics involving the co-existence of two of more generations of technology
are complex. The model offers only the effects of migrating users and declining
technology of the previous generation. These effects are not the only factors
contributing to the inertia of the previous generation. The model should be
extended with a few more effects of generation transition.
32 Data for this thesis were obtained from public domain sources.
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* More simulation runs involving the fluctuation of different variables should be
performed to provide further insights to the sensitivity of the system.
* The supply and demand model used should be made nonlinear as quantity of
demanded goods and quantity of supplied goods changes considerably across a
range of prices.
* The stock and flow depicting the adoption of newer consoles needs further
refinement.
* Models should include the demand of various customer segments (e.g. children
and mature games).
* The equilibria of strategic decisions made by competing firms (game theory
concepts) should be incorporated into the system dynamics model.
Also, many assumptions made in the modeling need to be validated with empirical
findings from the industry. Some key concerns include:
" How game quality affects user decision to adopt a game console?
" Do consumers value all drivers of console attractiveness (price, game variety, and
technological performance) equally?
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5.4 Architectural Innovation and Market Transitions
In a paper published by Henderson and Clark (1995), the authors conclude that
architectural innovation, defined as innovation that changes the way components of a
product are linked together, brings new rules to the industry. So it is not surprising the
advent of architectural innovations coincides with the emergence of dominant designs. In
the history of the video game console, there are two instances when architectural
innovation took place (Table 15).
Changes
Generation Technology Critical Relationships between Components
2nd Use of microprocessor Instructions and data are stored in the memory awaiting for
and memory execution by the microprocessor.
5th Use of 3D graphics Slow access speed of CD is justified by the ability to store
processor and CD massive amount of 3D textural graphics, which are needed
to enhance the visual effects produced by the 3D graphics
processor.
Table 15 - Summary of architectural innovation in the game console industry
A product is intrinsically linked to a firm's knowledge base, so architectural innovation
potentially destroys the usefulness of existing knowledge for a firm. On the other hand,
such disruptive innovation may enable other competitors to gain market share at the
expense of the incumbent, which explains why a new entrant like Sony ended as the
generation market leader. In terms of market implications, architectural innovations
trigger not only changes in the linkages between components in the game console system
but the interactions among competing firms in the market. A telling pattern emerges
when we look at the turnover of market leadership, market transitions, and the emergence
of architectural innovations taking place in the video game console industry. This
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observation is consistent with the findings of Afuah and Grimaldi (2005) in their
forthcoming paper on the subject. In Table 16, we list all the transitions taking place in
the industry, along with information about technological impact and whether the market
leader was an incumbent or new entrant.
Transition Technological Market Market Incumbent
Change Incumbent Leader33  Displaced?
1st - 2nd High Magnavox Atari Yes
2 nd High"4 Atari Nintendo Yes
3 rd - 4h Low Nintendo Nintendo No
4- 5t High Nintendo Sony Yes
5 th 6- Low Sony Sony No
Table 16 - Market Incumbents and Entrants
Table 16 shows a tight correlation between technological change and the displacement of
an incumbent company. When market transitions were low, incumbents like Nintendo
and Sony in the 3rd -+ 4th and 5th -+ 6th transitions respectively maintained their leadership
positions. Whereas in generations initiated by a disruptive technological shift, new
entrants, like Atari, Nintendo, and Sony in the I -st 2 t"d, 2 nd -, 3 rd, and 4 th - 5 th
transitions, ended as market leader. This observation is interesting because the magnitude
of impact from innovation between generations plays a critical role in determining
successful market entry. Conversely, dominant companies often struggle when faced with
disruptive technological change (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). Shifts in technological
innovation between generations are substantial enough that incumbents are likely to
struggle as they adopt the new innovation with their high degree of incumbent inertia.
3 The first firm to sell a product in a new generation of a market.
3 The transition is listed as high not for technological reasons but for economic reasons. The market crash
in 1983 (see Chapter 2 for more details) decimated the market, which effectively "reset" the competitive
dynamics in the market.
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There are unconcerned incumbent companies that often see new technology not
unnecessarily as a threat but rather an occurrence that may not fit the paradigm of the
firm (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).
5.5 Concerns of Market Competitiveness
In the beginning of this thesis, we asked the following questions:
1. How will technological discontinuities bring forth new dynamics that change the
competitive rules on which companies operate?
2. How does timing of market entry affect the competitiveness of a firm?
3. What role do complementary assets play in the market?
In the context of the video game console industry, let us address these questions with the
findings from our analyses.
1. How will technological discontinuities bring forth new dynamics that change the
competitive rules on which companies operate?
The video game console industry has experienced six overlapping generations of
technology. In each generation, we witness a different set of market leaders,
technological standards, and even dominant designs. New competitive dynamics are
introduced to the market as a new generation emerges, but prevailing dynamics from
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the previous generation do not disappear overnight. Such transitions between eras
presents challenges to companies, especially market incumbents, competing in this
market. When technological transition from generation to another is high, incumbent
companies typically do not respond well due to their incumbent inertia. Conversely,
new entrants stand to achieve a high level of success when they utilize compatible
complementary assets to better meet market changes and exploit new technological
innovations.
2. How does timing of market entry affect the competitiveness of a firm?
Once a company triggers the self-reinforcing feedback loops of network effects, a
powerful phenomenon of rapid growth may arise leading to outcomes that diverge
from those of other competitors. While early market entry is a good strategy for
building and growing the installed base, it may not yield the best results in certain
market conditions. A different strategy might be warranted for meeting a different set
of market conditions. When one or more generations of technology overlap, new
dynamics, such as uncertainty about new technological standards, high switching
cost, and marginal technological performance, are invariably introduced into the
market. These "spill-over" dynamics may diminish or even nullify first-mover
advantage. A better approach seeks an optimal market entry time that maximizes
competitive success by factoring in the conditions of the market as well as the "spill-
over" dynamics. Indeed Christensen, Suirez, and Utterback (1998) suggest that firms
stand the best chance of succeeding in the market when they enter during the period
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just before the emergence of a dominant design. They called this period of entry "the
window of opportunity." Firms entering too early with respect to the window of
opportunity are likely spending too much time learning and acquiring knowledge that
may not be relevant later. On the other hand, firms entering too late face high barriers
to entry brought forth by the effects of dominant design. Firms who fine-tune their
market entry to the window of opportunity stand to have a higher chance of success
(Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback, 1998).
3. What role do complementary assets play in the market?
Disruptive innovations potentially render linkages in an existing system ineffective
and as a result requiring firms to reconfigure their organization structure, business
processes, resources, and embedded knowledge in order to harmonize with adoption
of the disruptive innovation (Afuah and Grimaldi, 2005). Complementary assets are
critical factors in supporting the transformation from designs to manufactured goods
and the commercialization of those goods. Success in commercializing disruptive
innovations depends on how adept companies are in acquiring or building the optimal
configuration of complementary assets.
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5.6 Developed Framework for a Firm
At the firm level, a comprehensive conceptual model is constructed to illustrate the
successes and failures of firms operating in the market.
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Figure 17 - A synthesized conceptual framework of determinants to successful competitiveness, firm
controllable factors are shown in grey boxes
As we have learned from our discussions, a system consists of numerous cause-and-effect
relationships. Figure 17 depicts these interactions operating in a video game console firm.
A firm's performance depends on its ability to build a base of complementary assets and
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to accommodate for shifting dynamics. Today's complex market structure means a
bewilderment of variables that companies need to be aware of. Through reinforcing
feedback loops present in a network-based industry, early success in a process begets
later success. Therefore, firms with a strategic goal of achieving long-lasting performance
need to focus on elements that trigger the "virtuous" self-reinforcing cycles. Fortunately,
most of these triggers are variables on which competing firms already have the direct
control. In the context of the video game console industry, the four variables console
manufacturers need to focus on are:
" Quality of Software Support.
" Product Technology.
" Market Entry Time.
" Price.
5.7 Conclusion
Our market view of the evolution of the video game console industry provides us with an
understanding of the processes by which a firm achieves dominance when competing
with other firms in the market. New technological trajectories may emerge through
architectural innovations where the linkages among components of a product change
without altering its constituents. Technological discontinuity often creates difficulties for
established firms as embedded knowledge, business processes, and organizational
structure prevent these companies from fully exploiting subtle architectural changes. At
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the same time, other competing companies utilizing newer architectural innovation offer
better substitutes than products derived from prevailing designs. Our study corroborates
Henderson and Clark's assertion that the best opportunity for competing companies to
displace a market leader is through the application of architectural innovation. Historical
analysis suggests that when technological shifts between generations are architectural, its
impact on product design is great, and new entrants to the market displaced incumbent
companies. Conversely, incumbent companies prevail when no significant shift in
architectural design occured. Despite the central role that technology plays, it does not
function in isolation. Successful firms in this industry benefit greatly from strategies that
create and sustain complementary assets supporting the production and
commercialization of an innovation.
From the system dynamics analysis, we learned how self-reinforcing cycles such as
indirect network effects used to a firm's advantage increase the strength of determinants
operating in the system. We also observed that the consequence of a seemingly small
decision, good or bad, are amplified exponentially to the delight or chagrin of the
decision maker. Any sound strategy with an objective of attaining lasting competitive
advantage does not involve merely checking the precepts of strategic management. The
decision-maker needs to understand the underlying forces of the industry are constantly
changing and acting on them has consequences. It is through the understanding of the
conditions and interactions in which the system components operate that we can
effectively achieve competitive success.
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The analysis provided by this thesis offers valuable insights into the dynamics of the
video game console market. We have explored the cause-and-effect relationships
underlying firms and product launches that both succeeded and failed. The battle of the
next-generation consoles is currently underway, and the U.S. video game console market
is starting to get interesting again. Already, Microsoft had launched the Xbox 360 ahead
of its competitors. Meanwhile, incumbent Sony offers a compelling but expensive
alternative console called the Playstation 3. Concurrently, Nintendo tempts consumers
with the Wii, a low-cost, low-performing console featuring a novel motion sensor
controller. So, the question remains: will Nintendo get its crown back?
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6 Appendix A: An Overview of System Dynamics
This section offers an overview on system dynamics for readers who may not be familiar
with its concepts. The essence of system dynamics stems from the acknowledgement that
the structure of a system defines its behavior. System dynamics utilizes the notion of
feedback loops to model complex interactions among different components in a system.
The feedback loop is well established in the engineering domain where engineers have
been using them to analyze and control engineered systems. A real world complex system
is no different than that of engineering. Indeed, the structure of real-world institutional,
social, and physical systems is defined by the decision-making processes from within
these systems (Sterman 2000).
Decision-making processes in socio-economic systems is captured by causal loop
diagrams, which are used by practitioners of system dynamics to represent the structure
of a described system. In a system, a process or an interrelationship can be broadly
categorized as either a feedback process or an accumulation process, which is modeled as
a feedback loop and a stock respectively in a causal loop diagram.
6.1 Feedback Process
We represent the "cause-and-effect" relationship of two variables with a causal link,
denoted by an arrow in causal loop diagrams. When multiple variables are chained
together by causal links to form a closed loop, we establish a feedback loop identified
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either as positive or negative. The definitions of positive and negative feedback loops are
as follow:
" A positive feedback loop represents a feedback loop "in which an initial change in
one variable affects other variables in the loop in such a way as to reinforce the
direction of the initial change." (Lyneis, 2005)
" A negative feedback loop, on the other hand, has the opposite effect, "in which
initial change in one variable affects other variables in the loop in such a way as
to reverse the direction of initial change." (Lynesis, 2005)
A positive feedback loop and a negative feedback loop are also known as reinforcing
loop and balancing loop respectively. The following diagram shows an example of a
heater thermostat that illustrates the concepts that were discussed.
Actual
Temperature Desired
Temperature
B +
Temperature
Heat Gap
Figure 18 - A feedback loop of a thermostat system
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In a heater, a thermostat controls the regulation of heat. The thermostat monitors the
difference between the actual and desired temperature. When the actual temperature is
greater than the desired temperature, the temperature gap will be positive. Since a
positive temperature gap means the actual temperature has warmed up above the desired
temperature, the heat supplied by the heater needs to be lowered. The negative causal link
between the temperature gap and heat suggests the heat will be lowered with a rising
temperature gap. A lower heat eventually allows the actual temperature to drop below the
desired temperature. When the actual temperature falls below the desired temperature, the
negative temperature gap will cause the heat rise up (as denoted by the negative causal
link). We call the closed feedback loop of this system a balancing loop. When it is too
hot, the system structure causes the temperature to fall and vice versa. The overall effect
of the system is balancing.
6.2 Accumulation Process
While feedbacks are appropriate for representing many interrelationships in a system,
they are inadequate in capturing another central concept of system dynamics:
accumulation process. A stock captures the accumulation of variables operating in a
system. The inflow and outflow (collectively known as flow) represent the addition and
subtraction of variables to and from the stock. A good real life example of stock and flow
is one's bank account. The bank balance represents the stock while deposit and withdraw
represent the flow.
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Bank Balance rz=0<
Deposit Withdraw
Figure 19 - The stock and flow of a bank balance
6.3 Path Dependence
In system dynamics, a path-dependent system produces an end state that diverges from its
initial state. John Sterman in his book Business Dynamics (2000) defined path-
dependence as "a pattern of behavior in which ultimate equilibrium depends on the initial
conditions and random shocks as the system evolves." He uses the example of a bowl and
a marble to illustrate path-dependence and describe how the placement of the bowl
determines the behavior of the ball. The following is a summary of Sterman's explanation
of path-dependence.
Imagine you have a bowl and you drop a marble anywhere within the bowl (Figure 20).
No matter what the initial conditions are (velocity, height, etc), the marble will always
roll to a stop at the same spot at the bottom of the bowl. Such a system is a locally stable
equilibrium. The structure of this system is governed by a negative feedback loop as
shown Figure 21. The marble is not affected by perturbations and does not follow a path
to reach equilibrium. When a system is in stable equilibrium, Sterman observes that
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"pushing the marble off the equilibrium creates a force opposing the displacement."
(Sterman 2000) This observation is indicated by the negative feedback loop in the causal
loop diagram (Figure 21).
Figure 20 - The marble ends up in the same location 3 5
Position ofBall (P) Equiibrium
Position (P*)
3B+
Force on Ball Displacement (PF P*)
Figure 21 - Locally stable equilibrium is governed by negative feedback 3 5
3s Source: J. Sterman. Business Dynamics: System Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World. Irwin
McGraw-Hill, 2000. pp. 351.
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Let us now invert the bowl and place the marble on the top enough to make it stay in the
location as long as there is no outside disturbance (Figure 22). In this state, the slightest
disturbance will cause the marble to move away from its initial location. However, for the
inverted bowl, positive feedback now dominates this system. As the marble moves farther
away from its initial location, it experiences increasing force pulling it even farther away
from its initial location (Figure 23). The final location, when the marble eventually comes
to a rest, depends on the initial disturbance. The path which the marble travels depends
on the initial disturbance, such as the direction and force of the push as well as initial the
conditions like as weight of the marble and the surface condition of the bowl. Such a
system is a locally unstable equilibrium.
Figure 22 - A system in locally unstable equilibrium, the marble ends up in the same location 3 6
36 Source: J. Sterman. Business Dynamics: System Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World. Irwin
McGraw-Hill, 2000. pp 351.
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Position ofBal (P) Equilibrium
Position (P*)
+
Force on Ball Displacement (P
+ - P*)
Figure 23 - Locally unstable equilibrium is governed by positive feedback 36
6.4 Implications of Nonlinear Systems
Many nonlinear systems are dominated by positive feedbacks. In these systems, there
exist multiple paths leading to different end states. In some cases, these paths may
diverge significantly from their initial conditions. In addition, small noises and external
disturbances, mirroring random events in the real world, influence the evolutionary path.
These factors become significant as they are amplified by positive feedback processes in
the system. This explains why the emergence of standards early in the history of the
system can lead to system lock-in. In most cases, random events are unpredictable and
uncontrollable, but decision makers set strong initial conditions conducive for success
through sound policies early in the history of the system. Consequently, this effect
eventually leads to long-term decisive outcomes. On the other hand, the positive
feedbacks amplify bad decisions early, ultimately leading to an undesirable outcome.
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In formulating strategies in a competitive market, the decision-maker needs to be aware
of the feedback loops in the system. Let us suppose that a firm lowers the price of a good.
The feedback loops in a market that is governed by negative feedbacks will balance the
firm's competitive advantage gained from the lower price. The greater advantage one
firm has over the other, the more likely the other competitor responds with a price cut to
balance the relative advantage. However, for markets dominated by positive feedbacks,
the consequence of price cut is different from the prior case. Let suppose one firm lowers
price early to stimulate demand while another firm engages in a conservative policy that
reduces price as volume expands. In the end, the positive feedbacks in the system
reinforce both firms' strategies - an example of self-fulfilling prophecy as Sterman
(2000) characterizes it. As the aggressive company lowers price, demand will pick up.
Eventually, through economies of scale, the higher volume allows the company to lower
price even more. On the other hand, the conservative company never achieved the
volume increase and as a result, the inability to lower its price it is against its decision
policy, ultimately leads to further market loss.
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7 Appendix B: Additional Exhibits
Here are some charts showing the distribution of game ratings (on scale of 0 to 100) of
various game platforms.
The Distribution of Game Ratings for Sega Saturn
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Figure 24 - Distribution of game ratings (Sega Saturn) 7
The Distribution of Game Ratings for Sega Dreamcast
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Figure 25 - Distribution of game ratings (Sega Dreamcast) 7
3 Source: Gamerankings.com. Retrieved from http://www.gamerankings.com/.
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The Distribution of Game Ratings for Nintendo 64
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Figure 26 - Distribution of game ratings (Nintendo 64) 3
The Distribution of Gane Ratings for Nintendo GameCube
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Figure 27 - Distribution of game ratings (Nintendo GameCube)3 8
38 Source: Gamerankings.com. Retrieved from http://www.gamerankings.com/.
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Figure 28 - Distribution of game ratings (Sony Playstation)3 9
The Distibution of Game Ratings br Sony Playstation 2
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Figure 29 - Distribution of game ratings (Sony Playstation 2)39
39 Source: Gamerankings.com. Retrieved from http://www.gamerankings.com/.
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The Distribution of Game Ratings %r Sony Playstation
The Distribution of Gaine Ratings br Microsoft Xbox
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Figure 30 - Distribution of game ratings (Microsoft Xbox)"
The Distribution of Game Ratings f1r 3DO Interactive Multiplayer
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Figure 31 - Distribution of game ratings (3DO Interactive Multiplayer)""
4 0 Source: Gamerankings.com. Retrieved from http://www.gamerankings.com/.
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The Distribution of Game Ratings hr Atari Jaguar
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Figure 32 - Distribution of game ratings (Atari Jaguar)4'
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Figure 33 - Unit Sales of Game Consoles42
41 Source: Gamerankings.com. Retrieved from htp://www.gamerankings.com/.
42 Source: Compiled and estimated from: Games Investor Consulting Ltd. 2001 to Present. 2007. Retrievec
on April 26, 2007 from http://www.gamesinvestor.com/Research/History/2001 /2001 .htm; Sony,
Playstation Milestones. Retrieved on April 26, 2007 from
http://www.us.Rlaystation.com/Corporate/About/ThePlayStationStory/Milestones/default.html; Nintendo
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Annual Reports. Retrieved on April 27, 2007 from http://www.nintendo.com/corp/annual report.isp.
d
Platform 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
4th Genesis 4.5 3.0 22.7 35.5 48.1 57.9 34.9 12.1 3.0 4.0 3.0 0.5
Gen SNES 43.2 52.1 51.9 36.4 42.9 17.7 7.5 6.9 2.5
5th Saturn 5.3 11.4 2.1 0.4
Gen Pl station 11.1 28.2 45.9 55.5 50.8 39.4 16.6 13.6 8.3
N64 27.9 40.7 32.2 30.9 30.9 8.6 1.0
Dreamcast 12.8 29.2 25.9 13.1 8.7 7.8 6.3
6th PS2 48.9 51.3 51.7 51.4 52.8
Gen GameCube 9.2 17.7 21.4 20.2
___ Xbox 11.9 13.6 19.4 20.7
Table 17 - Evolution of market shares 3
Enter Exit
Company Year Year
3DO 1993 1996
Aaronix 1981 1986
Apollo 1976 1981
Acetronic 1979 1984
Adam 1974 1979
Advision 1982 1987
Akor 1992 1997
Al Sagar 1980 1985
Amstrad 1990 1992
Atari 1972 1996
Audiosonic 1977 1982
Awia 2001 2006
Bally 1977 1985
Bandai 1982 1996
Binatone 1980 1985
Bingo 1980 1985
Bit Corp 1983 1988
Brandt 1983 1985
Cabel 1987 1989
Capcom 1994 1999
Casio 1983 1999
CCE 1985 1990
Coleco 1975 1984
Columbia 1980 1985
Commodore 1977 1994
Conic 1979 1984
Continental Edison 1983 1986
Daewood 1983 1995
Dick Smith 1982 1987
Digiplay 1981 1997
43 Source: Compiled from: A. Afuah and R. Grimaldi. Architectural Innovation and the Attacker's
Advantage from Complementary Assets: The Case of the Video Game Console Industry. Social Science
Research Network (SSRN) Working Paper Series, 2005.
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Dynavision 1983 1988
Edu Juegos 1982 1987
Eduscho 1980 1985
Emerson 1982 1987
Epoch 1978 1984
Fairchild 1976 1978
Fountain 1980 1985
Fujitsu 1991 1996
Fullwis 1983 1988
Funtech 1995 2000
Gakken 1983 1984
Goldstar 1994 1996
Grandstand 1977 1982
GiG Electronics Leonardo 1980 1985
Grundig 1979 1983
Guangdong 2005 2008
H.G.S. Electronic 1977 1984
Hae Tae 1990 1995
Hanimex 1977 1984
Industria Argentina 1981 1986
Interstellar 1988 1993
Intercord 1980 1985
Interton 1977 1983
Intervision 1982 1987
Intv 1985 1991
ITMC 1978 1983
ITT 1977 1982
Jopac 1980 1985
Jove Club 1983 1988
JVC 1994 1999
Katz 1996 1997
Korting 1983 1988
Lansay 1981 1986
Leisure-Dynamics 1982 1984
Luxor 1980 1985
Magnavox 1972 1984
Mattel 1979 1984
MBO 1978 1983
Memorex 1992 1997
MiRai Media 1990 1995
Microdigital 1982 1987
Microsoft 2001 2008
Milton Bradley 1982 1984
Mustang 1978 1983
NEC 1987 1996
Nichibutsu 1983 1988
Nintendo 1983 2008
Nordmende 1978 1983
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OC 1980 1985
Ormatu Electric BV 1982 1987
Palson 1978 1983
Palladium 1977 1982
Panasonic 1993 1997
Palson 1979 1984
Philips 1977 1996
Pioneer 1993 1998
Polybrain 1982 1986
Polycon 1980 1985
Poppy 1978 1983
Prinztronic 1978 1983
Promotors 1980 1980
Radiola 1980 1985
Radofin 1979 1986
RCA 1977 1979
RDI 1985 1990
Rollet 1983 1985
Rowtron 1981 1985
S.H.G. 1982 1984
Saba 1977 1980
Sanwa 1978 1982
Sanyo 1994 1996
Schmid 1982 1984
Sears 1977 1983
Sega 1985 2001
Sheen 1978 1982
Shinco 2000 2005
Siera 1979 1984
SNK 1990 1997
Societe Occitane D'Electronique 1979 1984
Sony 1994 2008
Soundic 1980 1985
SSD 2005 2010
Tchibo 1982 1985
Tec Toy 1990 2008
Tomy 1981 2002
T.R.Q. 1979 1983
Teleng 1979 1984
Telepartner 1977 1984
Toy Quest 2005 2010
Unimex 1978 1983
Unitech 1999 2000
Universum 1981 1984
Videojet 1990 1995
Videomaster 1979 1983
VideoStellar 1978 1984
Voltmace 1978 1983
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Vtech 1983 1988
Waddington 1980 1984
World Book 1989 1990
Worlds of Wonder 1987 1991
Xinga Technologies 2004 2009
Yeno 1984 1989
Zap-It Games 2006 2011
Table 18 - Firms (including clone manufacturers) entering and exiting the world video game console
market44
"Source: Number of companies compiled and estimated from: Classic Consoles Center,
http://www.dieterkoenig.at/ccc; Console Database - http://www.consoledatabase.com/; Ultimate Console
Database - http://www.ultimateconsoledatabase.com/.
4 About a third of the data are missing the exit dates for firms participating in the market. For these firms
with missing exit dates, we determine their values with a date that is five years after market entry. The five
year value is averaged and approximated from known values.
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